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MID-AMERICA

An Historical Review

VOLUME 42, NUMBER 2

APRIL 1960

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Catholicism and Presidential Elections, 1865-1900

Since it was not until 1928 that a Catholic won the nomination for President it might be assumed that the factor of Catholicism seldom if ever received any attention in previous presidential elections. While it never gained the national prominence that it had in 1928, Catholicism was dragged into practically every presidential election in the post-Civil War generation. Yet as an issue it played a minor and subordinate role, and never came close to being a determining factor in the outcome of any one of these contests. This significant fact has sometimes been obscured by the exaggerated importance that has been attached to the amount of anti-Catholic propaganda used in some of these campaigns. But the appearance of much of this bias on a few occasions meant nothing more than that the parties were using every possible means to win votes and to discredit their opponents.

What Catholic issue there was in American politics in the Gilded Age grew out of the traditional anti-Catholicism that existed in the United States. This assumed that Catholics could not be trusted in public office, since they owed their political allegiance first to Rome, and because they sought to destroy the Republic and to abolish freedom of speech and of the press and religious toleration. Also as Catholics grew in numbers and political strength in the increasing industrial areas after the Civil War, and as the importance of rural areas, strongholds of Protestantism, began to decline, more and more the rural elements came to look upon Catholics as representing the most degrading features of urban life—slums, saloons, gambling houses, and corrupt political machines. Many Americans also feared that Catholics would destroy

the public school system if they got into public office, and some of the actions and statements by Catholics helped to increase this fear.

While the question of Reconstruction overshadowed all other issues in the presidential elections of the decade following the end of the Civil War, Catholicism, in a minor way, became involved in all three of them. In 1868 the most widely circulated charge by the Democrats against Schuyler Colfax, Grant's running mate, was that he had an anti-Catholic record. The Republicans retaliated when they attempted to discredit the Democrats by associating them with the Irish-Catholics and with "that abomination against common sense called the Catholic religion."¹ During the campaign of 1872, *Harper's Weekly* asserted that the Catholic Church in America was "loud in its denunciation of American civilization," that it furnished "three-fourths of the criminals and paupers who prey upon the Protestant community," that it never ceased its "attacks upon the principles of freedom," and that "its great mass of ignorant voters have been the chief source of our political ills."² This influential Republican journal declared that "Romish priests" and "Romish bishops" had become the partisans of Horace Greeley, "the candidate of disunion and religious bigotry," and the charge was made that the election of Greeley would be fatal in its results because he was "a noted opponent of the Bible and a firm friend of Rome."³ Furthermore, *Harper's Weekly* pictured Greeley as the accomplice of the "Jesuit faction" which "would rejoice to tear the vitals of American freedom, and rend the breast that has offered it a shelter."⁴ It charged that the Jesuits had allied themselves with the Ku Klux Klan and Tammany Hall, and it called upon "every sincere Protestant to labor ceaselessly to defeat the schemes of the Jesuits, and drive their candidate back to a merited obscurity."⁵

During the same campaign Thomas Nast, in a very famous cartoon, had Uncle Sam attempting to cut the ties between an

¹ Charles H. Coleman, *The Election of 1868*, New York, 1933, 99, 302-303.

² *Harper's Weekly*, September 14, 1872, quoted from J. R. G. Hassard, "American Catholics and Partisan Newspapers," *Catholic World*, XVI (March, 1873), 760.

³ *Ibid.*, 761, for first quotation; Leon B. Richardson, *William E. Chandler, Republican*, New York, 1940, 149 for second quotation.

⁴ *Harper's Weekly*, October 12, 1872 quoted from Hassard in *Catholic World*, XVI, 762.

⁵ *Harper's Weekly*, October 26, 1872 quoted from Hassard in *Catholic World*, XVI, 764.

American Bishop and the Pope by holding a naturalization paper inscribed, "This ends the foreign alliance." The Bishop had his arms full of papers with such items as "Vote for Horace Greeley because he does not want the Bible in public schools," "Vote as Roman Catholics. Destroy the Public Schools," "Orders from the Pope of Rome to the Catholics of America." Close by the side of the Bishop stood the Pope in a menacing and cunning fashion with his arms also full of papers that read, "Orders to all state officials that are Roman Catholics," "Down with the American public schools," and "I am Infallible. Therefore I must rule Church and State."⁶

By the mid-seventies the school question had stimulated such public interest that many Republican politicians began to talk about schools and religious issues. The New York Republican platform of 1875 denounced the use of any public funds for sectarian institutions "as a crime against liberty," and similar statements came from the Republican party in Connecticut, Ohio, Wisconsin, Missouri, and California.⁷ In Indiana the Republican state platform asserted that it was "incompatible with American citizenship to pay allegiance to any foreign power, civil or ecclesiastical."⁸ In most places the Republicans charged that the large number of Catholics in the Democratic party and its occasional support of state aid for their schools and religious equality in the public schools proved that a Democratic-clerical alliance had been formed to bring about a union of Church and State. President Grant, speaking at Des Moines, Iowa, in the fall of 1875 by implication condemned the Catholic Church and praised the public schools, and in his annual message to Congress, a few months later, recommended the adoption of a constitutional amendment that would have obligated the states to maintain a free public educational system, and that would have prohibited religious training in the schools and public aid to sectarian schools.⁹ In the same month James G. Blaine, one of the most prominent Republican leaders in the country, introduced in Congress an amendment to the federal Constitution that would have prohibited any

⁶ *Harper's Weekly*, XVI (October 19, 1872), 788.

⁷ Alvin P. Stauffer, "Anti-Catholicism in American Politics, 1865-1900," Unpublished Ph.D. Dissertation, Harvard University (1933), 65.

⁸ *Catholic Record*, X (April, 1876), 325.

⁹ *New York Tribune*, October 1, 1875; James D. Richardson, *A Compilation of the Messages and Papers of the Presidents, 1789-1897*, Washington, 1899, VII, 334, 356.

state from appropriating public funds for sectarian schools.¹⁰ The *New York Tribune* felt that Blaine was attempting to make whatever capital there was out of this issue, for as it observed, "Every politician knows that there is no subject on which the average well-to-do citizen in the country districts is so sensitive as upon the possibility of Roman Catholic aggression, particularly with reference to the schools."¹¹

In their national platform of 1876 the Republicans came out for a constitutional amendment forbidding the use of public funds for sectarian schools, and the Democrats, alarmed by the charge that they had joined an alliance with "the emissaries of the Pope" restated their loyalty to the public schools and their opposition to a division of the public school fund with denominational institutions.¹² The Republicans attempted to exploit the alleged Democratic—Catholic alliance by issuing several pamphlets which charged the Catholic Church in America with forcing her communicants to vote Democratic in order to make way for a change in our form of government. The pamphlets warned that the United States would be in danger "if the Ultramontane element of the Church, through the success of the Democracy, should obtain control of our national affairs."¹³ Several Republican papers and journals like the *Washington Chronicle* and *Harper's Weekly* published alleged exposures of clerical threats to excommunicate Catholics who voted for Rutherford B. Hayes, the Republican nominee.¹⁴

Harper's Weekly continued its assault upon Catholics when it asserted that of all religious groups only the Catholics proclaimed their

hostility to American institutions and laws . . . All the Roman Catholic press unites in the assault upon American education . . . The Roman Catholic priesthood holds in abject discipline the whole body of our Democratic voters . . . There is no room for dissent in this remarkable political organization. From the pulpit, the confessional, the church door, the lecture room, Roman Catholics are directed to obey the suggestions of their oracle at the Vatican . . . The Vatican directs the policy of the ruling section of the Democratic party.¹⁵

Harper's Weekly felt that in the centennial year of our nation "we

¹⁰ *Congressional Record*, 44 Cong., I Sess., p. 205.

¹¹ *New York Tribune*, December 1, 1875.

¹² Kirk Porter, *National Party Platforms*, New York, 1924, 89, 96.

¹³ Stauffer, "Anti-Catholicism in American Politics," 76-77.

¹⁴ *Washington Chronicle*, October 15, 28, 1876; *Harper's Weekly*, XX (October 21, 1876), 854.

¹⁵ *Harper's Weekly*, XX (July 29, 1876), 615.

are threatened with the complete reversal of the principles of Jefferson and Adams," and it asked, "Will not the people rise, from Maine to Texas, to defeat by an utter overthrow the plans of our foreign foe?"¹⁶

The support that Hayes received from the surviving Know-Nothing societies along with the anti Catholic sentiments of some of the Republican campaign literature naturally alienated Catholics, and a number of their journals spoke out against Hayes. The *Boston Pilot* on August 15, 1876, stated that Hayes was "supported by every anti-foreign, Know-Nothing clique that disgraces the country," and on September 2 declared that the Republican party would make the foreigner "a political helot without voice or vote." Earlier John Gilmary Shea in the *American Catholic Quarterly Review* had written that up until the time of Grant, the religion of a President was of no importance. But with Grant it had become different. Shea wrote:

That he is a Methodist is kept constantly before the public mind. He is actually priest-ridden. The bishops and ministers of his creed exercise an influence that the Presbyterians never dreamed of coveting, while Jackson or Polk were in power; or Episcopalians under Washington, Madison or Monroe.¹⁷

Because Catholics were unhappy about Hayes, the Democrats made an effort to win their votes for Tilden by publishing a number of documents aimed at proving that Hayes was anti-Catholic. But Hayes seemed to be bothered more by the charge of nativism than by that of religious bigotry. He told a close personal friend in a private letter that "the Know-Nothing charges are more than met (not by denial or explanation) but by charging the Democrats with their Catholic alliance," and in a letter to the Secretary of the Republican National Committee, Hayes said that he did "not favor the exclusion of foreigners from the ballot or from office," but that he did "oppose Catholic interference and all sectarian interference with political affairs, and especially with the schools."¹⁸ When the returns of the 1876 election were in and James A. Garfield thought that the Democrats had won he wrote privately that the Republicans had been defeated by "the combined power of rebellion, Catholicism, and whiskey."¹⁹

¹⁶ *Ibid.*

¹⁷ Volume I (January, 1876), 168.

¹⁸ Charles R. Williams, ed., *Diary and Letters of Rutherford Burchard Hayes*, Columbus, Ohio, 1929, III, 358, 366.

¹⁹ Allan Nevins, *Grover Cleveland, A Study in Courage*, New York, 1934, 182.

Catholicism was hardly discussed in the 1880 campaign, although the *New York Herald* proclaimed this was a Protestant country and we were a Protestant people, and the *San Francisco Argonaut* maintained that "Where the Protestant Church and the non-sectarian schoolhouse cast their shadows, wherever temperance, intelligence, and patriotism exist, there the Republican party has triumphed."²⁰ Garfield's margin of victory was less than 10,000 votes, and interestingly enough, John Gilmary Shea felt that the narrow Democratic defeat had been "brought about by the introduction of the Catholic question into politics, not by Catholics who did nothing, said nothing, asked nothing, but by schemers who used an old bugbear, and found fools enough to think them honest men."²¹ But the Catholic issue played no role at all, let alone the decisive one, in the outcome of the 1880 election, and Shea was probably misled by the undue importance he attached to some of the anti-Catholic sentiments that appeared occasionally in the press.

While Catholicism was a side issue in the national campaign of 1880, this did not appear to be the case in New York City. Here William R. Grace, an Irish-American and anti-Tammany Democrat, became the first Catholic to be named by either party for the office of Mayor. The Republicans emphasized his religion as a major obstacle to his election. Elihu Root stated that Grace's nomination meant that it was proposed to deliver control of the city government "to one sect to the exclusion of all others."²² A Protestant minister declared that Leo XIII contemplated the destruction of all Protestant institutions in the city if the Democrats won,²³ and the *New York Times* predicted that the election of a Catholic Mayor would mean that the public schools would be "Romanized" by the introduction of Catholic teachers and textbooks.²⁴ The religious issue probably cost Grace the vote of thousands of Protestant Democrats, for while he won, his plurality of 3,000 votes fell far below Hancock's 40,000 in the presidential election.

An incident occurred in 1884 which seemed to demonstrate how difficult it would have been to nominate a candidate for

²⁰ John Gilmary Shea, "The Anti-Catholic Issue in the Late Election," *American Catholic Quarterly Review*, VI (January, 1881), 40.

²¹ *Ibid.*, 37-38.

²² *New York Times*, October 30, 1880.

²³ *Ibid.*

²⁴ *Ibid.*, October 31, 1880.

President who had Catholic relatives, let alone a Catholic himself. A few of the Republican reformers like George Frisbie Hoar and George William Curtis opposed the nomination of either Blaine or President Arthur and decided to back General William T. Sherman who, next to Grant, was the most popular war hero in the North. But opposition to Sherman arose from the New York and Massachusetts delegations, because his wife was a Catholic, and Hoar's own group told him, "Our people do not want a Father Confessor in the White House."²⁵ But we must not read too much into this, for this does not prove the point that Sherman lost because of his Catholic connections. He was never a serious contender in 1884, and any candidate endorsed by the reform element would have found little support at the Republican national convention that year.

Catholicism also plagued Grover Cleveland in his bid for the nomination on the Democratic ticket although for reasons quite opposite from those that seemed to handicap Sherman. Before convention time Tammany opponents of Cleveland spread the word that he was a Know-Nothing, a "Presbyterian bigot," and "bitterly hostile to anything relating to Catholicity."²⁶ Tammany played up the fact that Cleveland, as governor of New York, had vetoed a bill appropriating state money for the Catholic Protector in New York City. When Cleveland's managers arrived at Chicago they found many worried supporters, "for all Chicago was talking about Cleveland's anti-Catholicism."²⁷ But officials of the Catholic Protector repudiated the charge of bigotry made against Cleveland, and several of his prominent Catholic appointees hastened to the Democratic convention to counter the rumors that he was anti-Catholic.²⁸

When Tammany continued to circulate the anti-Catholic charges against Cleveland during the campaign, some Catholics spoke out against these tactics. A group of them met in New York to protest against the attempt of Patrick J. Hickey, editor of the *Catholic Review*, to make it appear that their organization, the Catholic Union, opposed Cleveland and favored Blaine.²⁹ Father Edward McGlynn also came out publicly to the rescue of Cleveland.

²⁵ George F. Hoar, *Autobiography of Seventy Years*, New York, 1903, I, 407-408.

²⁶ Denis Tilden Lynch, *Grover Cleveland, A Man Four-Square*, New York, 1932, 180.

²⁷ *Ibid.*, 171.

²⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 172; H. C. Thomas, *The Return of the Democratic Party to Power*, New York, 1919, 179.

²⁹ Lynch, *Cleveland*, 262.

I am disgusted at the talk about alleged Irish defection and the Catholic vote for Blaine, and at the cost of several journals of supposed Irish and Catholic leanings, which had procured them the distinction (not without the profits) of being scattered broadcast as Blaine literature. The attempt to excite Catholic prejudice against Grover Cleveland is due almost entirely to conscienceless politicians . . . conscienceless scamps.³⁰

Cleveland seemed to be undisturbed about the religious allegations made about him and even felt that they would prove to be advantageous to him. "The Catholic question is being treated," he wrote in a letter, "and so well treated in so many different ways that I should not be at all surprised if what has been done by the enemy should turn to our advantage."³¹

Blaine was also caught up in the Catholic issue. Born of a Presbyterian father and a Catholic mother and raised as a Catholic, he had become a Presbyterian in his adult life. Thus Catholicism affected Blaine's candidacy in several different ways. In spite of his switch in faiths he was charged by some with being in reality a Catholic because he had sent one of his daughters to Paris to be educated in a "Romish" convent, and because another of his daughters had been married by a "Romish priest" to a former officer of the Papal Guards.³² To counter these allegations some of Blaine's friends made public a letter he had written in 1876 in which he asserted that the charge of Catholicism was a plot of his enemies, that his ancestors on his father's side were Presbyterians, that he abhorred religious tests in a republic where freedom of conscience was the birthright of every citizen, that he would not speak disrespectfully of his mother's faith, and that he would not be drawn into any avowal of hostility or unfriendliness to Catholics, though he had never received, nor did he expect, any political support from them.³³ The American Protestant Association issued a circular which stated that Blaine "was not a Papist," but "a straightout New England, orthodox Congregationalist."³⁴ Protestants pointed out that whatever Catholicism Blaine had had as a youth surely would not injure him in his later life, and one of them declared, "If, as a little child, he took his mother's hand and walked with her to church, why there is a good Protestant day of

³⁰ *Ibid.*, 269.

³¹ Nevins, *Cleveland*, 170.

³² *The Republic*, June 4, 1884.

³³ Gustavus Myers, *History of Bigotry in the United States*, New York, 1943, 220-221.

³⁴ Lynch, *Cleveland*, 230.

judgement coming which will, no doubt purify, as by fire, the touch of that mother's hand."³⁵ In contrast with these appeals the Democrats attempted to win the votes of Catholics by accusing Blaine of being a former Know-Nothing and "a renegade to his mother's faith," and by recalling his sponsorship of the constitutional amendment to prohibit state aid.³⁶

Much has been made about the Burchard episode playing a prominent part in Blaine's defeat in 1884. According to many contemporaries and historians, Blaine's failure to repudiate Burchard's slur of "Rum, Romanism, and Rebellion" made against the Democratic party alienated so many Irish-Catholic voters in New York City that the Republicans lost New York, a key state, by less than 1,200 votes. If this were the case, then Catholicism might be regarded as playing a determining role in the outcome of this election. But the importance of this incident in causing Blaine's defeat has been exaggerated. A number of factors explain Blaine's loss in New York, which both sides regarded as a doubtful state to begin with, and in a victory parade the Democrats carried a banner that summed up some of these.³⁷

<i>The World</i> Says the	Independents	Did It
<i>The Tribune</i> Says the	Stalwarts	Did It
<i>The Sun</i> Says	Burchard	Did It
Blaine Says	St. John	Did It

Theodore Roosevelt Says it was the Soft Soap Dinner
 We say Blaine's character Did It
 But We Don't Care What Did It
 It's Done.

But the temptation to regard Burchard's statement as swinging the Irish-Catholics in New York City away from Blaine in sufficient numbers to cause his defeat has persisted.

In the late eighties and early nineties there was another revival of the doctrines of Know-Nothingism, and such groups as the United Order of Deputies and the Patriotic Order Sons of America sprang up whose membership took an oath "not to help in electing or appointing a Catholic or a Catholic sympathizer to office,"³⁸ and periodicals like the *Loyal American* appeared which had edi-

³⁵ E. P. Oberholtzer, *A History of the United States Since the Civil War*, IV (1931), 205.

³⁶ Stauffer, "Anti-Catholicism in American Politics," 119-120.

³⁷ Henry L. Stoddard, *As I Knew Them, Presidents and Politics from Grant to Coolidge*, New York, 1927, 138.

³⁸ George Potier, *The American League*, Chicago, 1890, 20.

torials that declared, "The modern 'holy alliance:' Rum, Rome, the saloon and the priest. All they ask for is a fair divey between them of the boodle of American citizens."³⁹ The most important of these groups was the American Protective Association which was formed in Iowa in 1887 and which soon spread into other parts of the country. The story of the A.P.A. is a very familiar one, and need not detain us here except to recall a few pertinent facts. There is no doubt about this organization being extremely anti-Catholic and its seeking to exploit Protestant fears about Catholicism. Every A.P.A. member had to take an oath in which he denounced Catholicism and in which he swore that he would not "knowingly vote for, recommend for nor appoint, nor assist in electing or appointing a Roman Catholic nor any one sympathizing with Roman Catholicism to any political position whatever."⁴⁰

The A.P.A. put out inflammatory pamphlets. It published fabricated pastoral letters from the American hierarchy to American Catholics calling upon them to form a "Papal Party," to "plot and labor for the absolute supremacy" of the Pope, to serve "the interests of Catholicism" in "their political work," and to fill all the political offices "with men selected by the bishop of the diocese." It printed and widely circulated forged papal encyclicals such as the one from Leo XIII which represented the Pope as declaring that since the Catholic Columbus had discovered America, this continent belonged to the Pope, and the time had come to take forcible possession. It spread stories that Catholics had stored arms and ammunition in cathedrals, convents, churches, and parochial schools for use against Protestants.⁴¹ That these fabrications had their effect, especially in the rural areas, is illustrated by a letter from a physician in a small town in Ohio.

We have been, and still are, having an excitement in our usually quiet town, in regard to the Catholic question. There is not a Catholic in the entire township; but a large number of our people are intensely stirred up, some almost prostrated with fear, afraid that the Catholics are about making a wholesale attack upon Protestants, killing and plundering, and destroying our schools and churches. Of course it obtains the strongest foothold among the ignorant and unthinking, yet it seems to cause great uneasiness and fear among many of the more intelligent.⁴²

³⁹ Stauffer, "Anti-Catholicism in American Politics," 170.

⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, 176.

⁴¹ *Ibid.*, 225-226, 300-301; Oberholtzer, *History of the United States*, V, 428.

⁴² Washington Gladden, "The Anti-Catholic Crusade, *The Century*, XLVII (March, 1894), 792-793.

Now all this would seem to indicate that the A.P.A. had stirred up a national excitement about the participation of Catholics in American public life, but we must be careful not to exaggerate the importance of this organization and its propaganda in national politics. Cecil Spring Rice described it as a group which sought "to prevent Catholics, especially Irishmen, from being Republican office holders,"⁴³ and it is true that in just about every case it worked with the Republican party. But where the A.P.A. influenced elections most was in local areas and especially in the Mid-West. In a number of communities in Nebraska, Iowa, Illinois, Michigan, and Ohio, the A.P.A. won control of the Republican party and carried many local elections, and in these areas politicians appeared to be reluctant to nominate Catholics for office for fear the religious issue would defeat them. In 1894 when the A.P.A. claimed a membership of two million and boasted that it was "travelling at the rate of a cyclone," it was asserted that it ruled a number of leading cities including New York, Brooklyn, Boston, Chicago, New Orleans, San Francisco, Pittsburgh, St. Louis and Kansas City.⁴⁴ However, such claims by the A.P.A. along with the one in 1896 of controlling four million votes in the United States have to be accepted as more propaganda than fact. Politicians and parties did not succumb so easily, as it has been assumed, to A.P.A. demands, even on the local and state level where the organization wielded its greatest power. For example, Henry Cabot Lodge, a young rising Republican politician then, never had anything to do with the A.P.A. and resisted its demands. Writing to Theodore Roosevelt in 1894 about the Massachusetts Republican platform of that year, Lodge said, "It meets the A.P.A. squarely, denouncing any attempt to discriminate on account of religion, which was bold and wise." Himself a rising and ambitious politician, Roosevelt told Lodge, "I think that no good can be done with such a movement as the A.P.A.," and he further predicted that "The A.P.As. won't cut any figure at all."⁴⁵

What excitement the A.P.A. might have been able to stir up if a Catholic had been running for President we shall never know, and to speculate about it with personal opinions is not the task of the historian. Catholicism received practically no attention in,

⁴³ John A. Garraty, *Henry Cabot Lodge*, New York, 1953, 141.

⁴⁴ Oberholtzer, *History of the United States*, V, 427-428.

⁴⁵ Garraty, *Lodge*, 141-142; Elting E. Morison, ed., *The Letters of Theodore Roosevelt*, Cambridge, Mass., 1951, I, 400-401.

the 1888 campaign, but in that of 1892, the A.P.A. tried to arouse voters about the Catholic issue in several different ways. The A.P.A. pointed to the maladministration of New York City under Tammany Hall as an example of the evil effects of the alleged alliance between a corrupt political machine and "Romish emissaries." It accused Cleveland of installing a direct telephone connection from the White House to the residence of Cardinal Gibbons to secure the latter's approval of everything the President did. Cleveland was also charged with putting a Catholic at the head of every division of the federal employees and with having issued orders that every government clerk contribute to the Sisters of Charity. Blaine was accused of currying favors with the Catholics by sending his children to Catholic schools and by holding conferences with the hierarchy, and the selection of Catholics to head both national committees was attacked as a bid for papal control.⁴⁶ But while these matters were played up they were really side issues and diversions, and they had no effect upon the outcome one way or the other.

Catholics even received the blame for bringing on the Panic of 1893. The charge was made that servant girls and workers in the Mid-West, prodded by the Catholic clergy had started runs on the banks and that everywhere Catholic merchants had refused to purchase and Catholic manufacturers had closed their plants as part of a Catholic plot to disrupt our economic life so as to seize control of the country.⁴⁷ At their national convention in 1896 the Republicans, not wanting to offend the A.P.A. by using a Catholic and not wishing to affront Catholics by employing a Protestant, asked a Jewish Rabbi to open the proceedings with a prayer.⁴⁸ But by this time whatever political influence the A.P.A. had had on a national level had begun to disappear. The Republicans, who had adopted a plank declaring against appropriations for sectarian institutions in every one of their platforms since 1876, refused to take a similar stand in 1896. This was humiliating enough for the A.P.A., but what was even more humiliating, and which dramatically underscored its weakness in national politics, was the fact that the Committee on Resolutions had at first accepted the plank, then reconsidered and defeated it when Archbishop John Ireland sent a telegram to the national chairman asking the Repub-

⁴⁶ Stauffer, "Anti-Catholicism in American Politics," 309-310.

⁴⁷ *Ibid.*, 326.

⁴⁸ Oberholtzer, *History of the United States*, V, 429.

lican party not to "lower itself to recognize, directly or indirectly, the A.P.A."⁴⁹ While some efforts were made during the campaign to list both McKinley and Hanna as Catholics, the economic issues in 1896 crowded everything else out.

Thus Catholicism had no real significance in any one of the presidential elections of the post-Civil War generation. As an issue, and even as a propaganda device, it was always overshadowed by other matters. Whether Catholicism would have become an important factor if a Catholic had run for President we shall never know, for neither one of the major parties seriously considered a Catholic as a candidate for the presidency. From this it might appear that they were unwilling to take the risk of running a Catholic for President, and that this reluctance excluded presidential possibilities who, had they not been Catholics, might have otherwise been considered or named. But such a conclusion rests more upon emotionalism than it does upon historical evidence. No doubt there would have been sturdy obstacles in the way of running a Catholic for the presidency, but how much of a risk or liability such a nomination would have been to a party in these years will never be known. There is no evidence to warrant the conclusion that the major parties held back from naming a Catholic because of the risk element involved. More to the point is the fact that there were no Catholics prominent, popular, or attractive enough for the parties to consider. We do know, though, that Catholicism did provoke bitter political fights in local and state contests in these years, but even in these situations, the religious factor did not prevent Catholics from being elected to office.

VINCENT P. DE SANTIS

University of Notre Dame

⁴⁹ Humphrey J. Desmond, *The A.P.A. Movement*, Washington, 1912, 88-89.

The Philippines and the Royal Philippine Company

The Royal Philippine Company, created in 1785 by decree of Charles III of Spain, passed through various stages of fortune, and dissolved in 1834 amid the internal difficulties that racked Spain and the international imbroglios in Europe. Spain's Asian venture in imperialism is significant in relation to the status of international trade at the time of the Company's inception. The existence of the Royal Philippine Company could not but be regarded by Holland and England as a frontal attack upon their interests in the Orient because the success of the Company would not simply have eliminated the Spanish peninsula as a market for Asian goods carried by these two great mercantile powers, but would have seriously afflicted their illegal trade in such materials with the ports of Central and South America. Indeed, the success of the Spanish endeavor would have been a major step toward sealing off the Spanish empire from the commercial nations of Europe, an objective long sought by the Spanish kings. Within the framework of the Spanish empire, the Royal Philippine Company could have served as a unifying factor, a factor sorely needed in view of the dismemberment of the empire that occurred in the nineteenth century.

The historical importance of the Royal Philippine Company is inseparable from the royal intention in its formation. In the Company's founding cedula, Charles III specifically states that the Company's "principal purpose must remain the union of American and Oriental commerce. . . ."¹ Eduardo Malo de Luque, writing in Spain at the end of the first five years of Company existence, concurs with the cedula in his statement of the Company's major objective.² In 1810, Tomás de Comyn, a Company agent in the Philippines, reiterates the view of Malo de Luque and the clear wording of the royal cedula.³ Comyn's statement was made in

¹ *Real cédula de la Compañía de Filipinas de 10 de Marzo de 1785*, Artículo xxvi, in Eduardo Malo de Luque, *Historia política de los establecimientos ultramarinos de las naciones europeas*, V, Madrid, 1790, piezas anexas 2, 11-94.

² *Ibid.*, V, 344.

³ Tomás de Comyn, *Estado de las Islas Filipinas en 1810*, Manila, 1820, 68-69.

defense of the Company against those who considered the development of the Philippine Islands to be the sole purpose for the existence of the Company. Curiously, existing writings on the Royal Philippine Company, while drawing heavily upon both Malo de Luque and Comyn, have adopted the view which both writers opposed. This tendency to regard the Company only in its Oriental context with emphasis on the Philippines pervades the entire published bibliography of the Company. Unfortunately, this Philippine-centric interpretation of Company history has achieved so general an acceptance that an accurate assessment of the place of the Company in Spanish history must be corroborated by a reappraisal of the role of the Philippines in Company history. A chronological survey of pertinent materials will help to explain the inaccuracy of the Philippine-centric interpretation.

The introduction of the Philippine Islands into Company literature begins in 1765, with the "Demonstración" of Francisco Leandro de Viana.⁴ This document is a plea to the king of Spain for renewed efforts in the development of the Philippines. Viana's view of possible royal profit in the Philippines is optimistic, although as a royal official he well knew that to his time the Islands constituted a drain on the Spanish treasury and had never been profitable to their Spanish majesties.⁵ The plea of the "Demonstración," then, was in the nature of a promise to the crown. Viana's demand for an increase in the quality, discipline, and number of Spanish troops in the Islands points up a serious obstacle in the path of any proposed plan for the improvement of the Philippines.⁶ The southern Islands were under continual Moro attack and the success of either cash-crop agriculture or regular coast-wise traffic among the islands would have had to depend upon the unquestioned power of Spain throughout the archipelago. The Philippine historian José Montero y Vidal adequately underscores the failure of Spain to rectify this debility within the Company's time.⁷ Moreover, the Company, as constituted under Spanish law, was in no way able to inaugurate measures in this direction as were its English and Dutch counterparts in their respective

⁴ Francisco Leandro de Viana Zavala Vehena Saenz de Villaverde, "Demonstración del misero deplorable estado de las Islas Philipinas...", Febrero, 1765"; Newberry Library, Chicago, Ayer Collection, cited hereinafter as Ayer Collection.

⁵ William Lytle Schurz, *The Manila Galleon*, New York, 1939, 182.

⁶ Viana, "Demonstración," Parte I, capítulos 1-2.

⁷ José Montero y Vidal, *Historia de la Piratería Malayo-Mohametana en Mindanao Joló y Borneo*, II, Madrid, 1888.

spheres. The language of the king was most explicit. The Company was defined as "solely mercantile" and was forbidden to employ any of its facilities or personnel in political activities.⁸

The writing of Nicolás Norton y Nichols preceded Viana's "Demonstración" by a few years, and contributed to the support of Viana's contentions and perhaps to the formulation of his ideas. Norton, a naturalized Spaniard of English origin, accused Spain, the world's greatest consumer of cinnamon, of supporting the Dutch establishments in Ceylon by neglecting to develop cinnamon in the Philippines.⁹ Viana, with access to the royal ear, included Norton's charge in the "Demonstración" with a mention of the "benefit of cinnamon" cultivation.¹⁰ The preoccupation of both Viana and Norton with the production of spices stems, of course, from their knowledge of the Dutch success in the Spice Islands. The area of the Philippines suited to the cultivation of cinnamon, however, was well within the striking range of the Sultan of Joló. The dream of spice traffic formed the foundation of these and subsequent demands for agricultural development of the Philippines.

In 1790, the sixth year of the Company's life, there was published in Madrid the fifth volume of Eduardo Malo de Luque's *História política*. This author is identified from various sources as the Duke of Almodóvar.¹¹ His volumes are generally regarded as a Spanish version of Raynal's *Histoire Philosophique*.¹² The

⁸ *Real cédula... de 10 de Marzo de 1785*, Artículo xxxiii. The royal injunction reads as follows: "Declaro que esta Compañía ha de ser solamente mercantil, sujeta á las leyes de la Monarquía, como qualquiera otro comerciante particular; á excepción de la gracias, privilegios y exenciones que le concedo para su fomento, sin que por ningún motivo ni pretexto puede mezclarse ni introducirse en materias políticas, alianzas ni otros negocios de esta naturaleza, á menos de tener expresa orden ó comision mia; y si alguno de sus empleados ó Subalternos contraviniese á esta prohibición, y usase de los buques y facultades de la Compañía en otras empresas que las de comercio se castigará severamente como reo de Estado."

⁹ Nicolás Norton y Nicols, "Comercio de las Islas Philipinas..., Manila, [1759]," Ayer Collection.

¹⁰ Viana, "Demonstración," Parte II, capítulo 3.

¹¹ Eduardo Malo de Luque is so identified by W. E. Retana, the Philippine collector and bibliographer in his *Aparato*, II, Madrid, 1906, 581; Tomás de Comyn quotes from the fifth volume of Malo de Luque and attributes the quotation to the Duke of Almodóvar, *Estado*, 71; Antonio Palau y Dulcet says of the *História política*, "Su autor es Pedro Francisco Luxán y Suárez de Góngora, Duque de Almodóvar, quien se escudó bajo el anagrama de su título nobiliario," in *Manual del librero Hispano-Americano*, V, Barcelona and London, 1926, 22.

¹² Roland Dennis Hussey, *The Caracas Company, 1728-1784, a Study in the History of Spanish Monopolistic Trade*, Cambridge, 1934, 342. Professor Hussey calls it "A revision, satisfactory to the Spanish censor, of Abbé Raynal's *Histoire Philosophique*."

introduction to the fifth volume is prefaced by the statement that publication was delayed to allow for the securing of Company documents; Malo de Luque, then, presumably concludes his fifth volume with original material on the Company. In his text, the author cites two documents, a report of the Manila directors to the Captain-General of the Philippines, dated November 18, 1788, and a report of the Manila directors to the Madrid directors, dated July 10, 1789. The same volume of the *História política* contains appended documents including the Company's founding cedula and a *Plan general*. The latter document is a concise report of the Company's commercial achievement to September 30, 1789.

The *Plan general* makes the fifth volume of the *História política* the most valuable work published to date on the Royal Philippines Company, because it completes and places in world context the narrower considerations of Malo de Luque's narrative. The sixty pages of text which the author devotes to the Company are concerned almost wholly with Company efforts in Island development, such as investments in agriculture, expenditures on installations for external and internal trade, and the blind opposition of the Manilans to the venture. Taken alone, these pages are the foundation of the Philippine-centric interpretation of Company history. The following examination of writings on the Company will show that through a process of incremental distortion, the textual portion of the *História política* has served as the nucleus for a series of commentaries and histories that accept the Company as an almost purely Philippine venture.

Within the lifetime of the Company, another writer contributed his observations to the bibliography of the Royal Philippine Company. In 1810, Tomás de Comyn, a Company factor in the Islands, published his *Estado*, an analysis of the economic state of the Philippine Islands in 1810. One chapter of the *Estado* is devoted to the Company and even this is in the nature of a post mortem. Comyn, in the employ of the Company in the Islands, was predisposed to regard Company abandonment of the Philippines as gravely significant; his account of the Company's failure in the Islands carries with it an impression of global failure. He explicitly states, however, that the development of the Philippine Islands was not the primary objective of Company commerce. He cites Malo de Luque in his contention that the primary purpose of the organization was to unite Asian, American, and European trade.¹³ A more

¹³ Comyn, *Estado*, 68-69, citing Malo de Luque, V, 344.

precise delineation of this primary objective is lacking in the work of either man. Presumably, the royal intent encompassed a scheme of traffic among Spanish dominions routed through Spain for the benefit of Spain, but neither Comyn nor Malo de Luque regarded Philippine development as the Company's cardinal goal. Later writers, however, were to mate the Philippine emphasis of Malo de Luque's text with Comyn's concern for the Islands and produce the Philippine-centric interpretation of Company history.

Malo de Luque details the Company's attempts to improve the Islands. Comyn qualifies Malo de Luque's sanguine exposition by reference to "[t]wenty-four years of impotent and gratuitous efforts," and so predicates failure as the sequel to great effort. Comyn continues in this pessimistic vein telling of a more than 80 per cent increase in the purchase price of Asian goods caused by the compulsory routing of traffic through Manila. He states that this "mal extendida sistema" prevailed for ten or twelve years, and detracted consistently from the Company's security. What remains as Comyn's most damaging criticism of the Company's organizational pattern was his characterization of the entire Company approach to Philippine development as mistaken. He believed that the Company had set an impossible task for itself in assuming the triple role of investor, producer, and carrier of Philippine agricultural and manufactured produce.¹⁴ The backward economic state of the Philippines at the time of the Company's arrival unquestionably forced the Manila directorate to take this manifold action. Comyn's criticism, however, implies unrestrained zeal on the part of Company officials whereas later Philippine writers infer, simply, stupidity. The importance of both Comyn and Malo de Luque to the Philippine-centric view is not in what they wrote, but in how their writings were used in the course of the nineteenth century.

The first step in the development of the Philippine-centric interpretation was taken by Sinibaldo de Mas y Sans nine years after the Company's official demise. In 1843, Mas had published at Madrid his *Informe sobre el estado de las islas Filipinas en 1842*. A point by point comparison shows that he takes almost all his information from Malo de Luque. W. E. Retana says that Mas "in the historical section [of the *Informe*] drank the blood of the Duke of Almodóvar..."¹⁵ In copying Malo de Luque without

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, 62-71.

¹⁵ *Aparato*, II, 581.

citation, Mas devoted more attention to rephrasing than did those who, in their turn, were to copy him. Malo de Luque had originally attributed the difficulties between the Company and the Manila merchants to the blindness and ill-considered action of the latter, resulting in the maintenance of "... *la mas absoluta separación de intereses, y abrigando un funesto espíritu de división.*"¹⁶ Mas, writing in the Philippines, might have been expected to seek out better causes for this resentment, but contents himself with ascribing Manilan reluctance to "... *un funesto espíritu de separación de intereses.*..."¹⁷ Malo de Luque lists the following Company expenditures in the Islands: Philippine produce, 3,127,712 *r.v.*; real estate, 5,168,247 *r.v.*; Asian produce purchased from Manilans, 8,779,876 *r.v.*; totaling to 17,024,836 *r.v.*¹⁸ With arithmetic fastidiousness, Mas presents the same information—correcting a one *real* error in Malo de Luque's addition.¹⁹ The importance of this particular instance of copying is that in the original, Malo de Luque is emphasizing the success of the Company in off-setting the loss to Manila of the Acapulco galleon of the previous year while Mas is presenting an account of the tremendous waste of capital by the Royal Philippines Company.

Mas draws from Tomás de Comyn after fully utilizing Malo de Luque's record of the first five years. The *Informe* tells us of an 80 to 100 per cent increase in the cost to the Company of Asian goods purchased at Manila, the establishment of agencies in China and India, and the ten or twelve years of the compulsory Manila call.²⁰ All of this is from Comyn's *Estado*.²¹ The only significant change interpolated by Mas is where Comyn speaks of an increase in excess of 80 per cent in the cost to the Company

¹⁶ *História Política*, V, 319, 345-346.

¹⁷ *Informe*, I, Parte Segunda, 33.

¹⁸ Malo de Luque, V, 362-363, citing a report of the Manila directors to the Captain-General of the Philippines, November 18, 1788.

¹⁹ The reliability of Malo de Luque's arithmetic is certainly open to question. Another instance of his inaccuracy is his statement, *Ibid.*, V, 349, that the Company exported from the Philippines 14,350 *libras* of indigo in 1786, at which figure he may have arrived through some calculation involving the price of indigo; whereas an official Company document lists the figure at exactly half that amount. The document: *Exposición de la compañía de Filipinas, relativa á su establecimiento, y á su importancia politico-mercantil: a los medios que ha empleado para llenar los fines de su instituto; y á la justicia y necesidad de su conservación para utilidad general del Estado, dirigida por su Junta de gobierno a las Cortes generales y extraordinarias de la Nación*, Cadiz, 1813, 361; hereinafter cited as *Exposición*, 1813.

²⁰ *Informe*, I, Parte Segunda, 48.

²¹ *Estado*, 65.

of Asian goods purchased at Manila, Mas categorizes the increase as an 80 to 100 per cent loss of investment. Mas continues the emphasis on Company efforts in agriculture with the adoption of Comyn's regret, but in a more modest presentation. "*El sistema de derramar dinero para transformar el estado agrícola y fabril de las islas fué seguido por 20 años...*"²² Mas concludes with the comment that Island development "diminished frightfully" the capital of the Company. He attributes the failure of Oriental commerce to the "political convulsions of the epoch."²³ This estimate of the effect of the war on Company commerce can probably be justified. In short, Mas' Company history is taken from Malo de Luque and Comyn; the first five years are a repetition of the *História política* and later years are covered with information from the *Estado*. With minor exceptions and what appears to be a single error in copying, Mas' dependence upon these two works is complete.²⁴ His contribution to the Philippine-centric interpretation of Company history is the result of his distortion of the sources which he employed.

In December, 1842, J. Mallat, a French author, returned to Paris from his world travels to write his two volume work on the Philippines.²⁵ His arrival was well timed with the January, 1843, publication of Mas' *Informe* in Madrid. Where Mas takes from Malo de Luque with attention to rephrasing, Mallat takes from Mas and shields the theft by escape into another language. Mallat's dependence upon Mas can best be described by comparative statements from their works.

On the foundation of the Company:

En 1784 la compañía de Caracas, que por la cesación de su privilegio esclusivo buscaba objeto ocupar sus cuantiosos fondos. . . .²⁶

En 1784, la compagnie des Caraques vit expirer son privilège; éprouvant quelque embarras à trouver un emploi avantageux pour ses grands capitaux. . . .²⁷

²² *Informe*, I, Parte Segunda, 48; Comyn tells of "twenty-four years of impotent and gratuitous effort," *Estado*, 62-71.

²³ *Informe*, I, Parte Segunda, 49.

²⁴ Mas dates the *Real cédula* . . . de 10 de Marzo de 1785, 1784, *Informe*, Parte Segunda, 31, while Malo de Luque, *Historia política*, V, 342, gives the correct date.

²⁵ *Les Philippines, Histoire, Geographie, Moeurs, Agriculture, Industrie et Commerce, des Colonies Espagnoles dans L'oceanie*, 2 vols., Paris, 1846.

²⁶ Mas, *Informe*, Parte Segunda, 31.

²⁷ Mallat, *Les Philippines*, II, 292.

On the royal requirement of Philippine development:

Un 4 por 100 de los beneficios debia emplearse en el fomento de la agricultura é industria del pais: la compañía tenia que comprar todos los efectos de China é India en Manila, ya fuese de sus vecinos ya de especuladores de aquellos paises por medios de contratas á entregar en Manila. . . .²⁸

Quatre pour 100 de bénéfice devaient être employés à l'encouragement de l'agriculture et de l'industrie du pays. La compagnie était obligée d'acheter à Manille toutes les marchandises de la Chine ou de l'Inde, soit des habitants, soit des spéculateurs venus ces pays. . . .²⁹

The foregoing information concerning the purchase of Oriental goods at Manila was taken by Mas from Comyn.³⁰ The story of the foundation of the Company and the expiration of the privileges of the Caracas Company was drawn from Malo de Luque.³¹ Mallat, of course, simply translated Mas. In the following quotations, the data on the comparative price of Sumatran pepper and the estimate of total Philippine pepper production are of unknown origin.³² The data on the price offered by the Company for Philippine pepper and the optimistic estimate of annual pepper production by the Manila directors are taken from Malo de Luque.³³

On the Company attempts in agriculture:

Concibió la errónea idea de crear en las islas los artículos de que necesitaba vastos acopios para sus operaciones, la seda, el anil, la canela, el algodón, la pimienta; estableció factorías subalternas, compró tierras, repartió semillas, aperos de labranza y premios, hizo adelantos de dinero y consiguió el que algunos pueblos contratasen entregar á una convenida época cierta cantidad de dichos productos á precios muy subidos: la pimienta se estipuló al de 13 de medio pesos fuertes el pico de

[M]alheureusement, elle conçut la fautive idée de cultiver, dans l'archipel même, des productions dont il lui fallait, pour ses opérations, de grands approvisionnements, telles que la soie, l'indigo, la canelle, le coton, le poivre; elle établit des comptoirs, elle acheta des terres, elle distribua des graines, des instruments et donna des primes; elle fit des avances de fonds et engagea certains pueblos à des époques convenues, certaines quantités des ces produits à des prix très-élevés; ainsi, par exemple,

²⁸ Mas, *Informe*, Parte Segunda, 31.

²⁹ Mallat, *Les Philippines*, II, 292.

³⁰ Comyn, *Estado*, 65.

³¹ Malo de Luque, *História política*, V, 341-342.

³² This figure of unknown origin, 64,000 libras, is far short of the Company tally of pepper production to 1802. The official figure is 272,446 libras, 13 onzas, *Exposición*, 1813, 48-54.

³³ *História política*, V, 368, citing a report of the Manila directors to the Madrid directors, July 10, 1789.

137 libras, mientras que en Sumatra se puede comprar á 3 ó 4. El factor de Manila se hallaba en 1789 tan alucinado acerca de este punto que en un informe a la superior dirección de Madrid, calculaba que de allí á tres años exportaría la compañía 9600 picos y en los sucesivos se podría abastecer á la España, America y buena parte de Europa. Sin embargo, nunca se llegaron á recoger mas de 64,000 libras a costa de grandes pérdidas.³⁴

elle offrit de payer le poivre 13½ piastres le picol de 137 livres, tandis qu'a Sumatra en pouvait l'acheter pour 3 ou 4 piastres. L'illusion fut poussée si loin à cet egard, qu'en 1789 l'agent de la compagnie à Manille écrivit à la direction générale, à Madrid, qu'il espérait, au bout de trois ans, pouvoir expédier, 9600 picols, et que, plus tard, el fournait seul aux besoins de l'Espagne et d'une grand partie de l'Europe. Le fait est qu'il ne put jamais se procurer plus de 64,000 livres par an, sur lesquelles encore la compagnie éprouva des pertes considérables.³⁵

Manuel Azcarraga y Palermo wrote *La libertad de comercio en las islas Filipinas* which was published in Madrid in 1871. Azcarraga employed Malo de Luque, Comyn, and Mas in his thirty-four page presentation of Company history. Only Mas is cited. Azcarraga's reliance upon Malo de Luque may be partially illustrated by comparative statements of the two authors on the foundation of the original Philipppines Company in 1733.

... por cédula de 29 de Marzo de 1733: por ella se le concedian varios privilegios, no del agrado de nuestros comerciantes de Manila, los cuales protestaron y reclamaron por medios de diputados en la Côte contra la creación de aquella sociedad; y por desgracia para las islas, no llegó esta á consolidarse ni á despachar expedición alguna.³⁶

... Real Cédula de 29 de Marzo de 1733, en que se le erigió concediendola varios privilegios que enormemente perjudicaban las ideas del comercio de Manila. Protestaron sus Diputados contra la espresada erección y sus condiciones. Estas y otras inoportunas circunstanacias de aquel tiempo, embarazon que llegase á consolidarse la citada compañía, ni á emprehender expedición alguna.³⁷

Azcarraga follows the crop by crop coverage of agricultural endeavor exactly as in Malo de Luque. *La libertad* adheres so closely to Malo de Luque that 27 of the 34 pages which Azcarraga devotes to the Company deal with the first 5 years of Company

³⁴ Mas, *Informe*, I, Parte Segunda, 33-34.

³⁵ Mallat, *Les Philippines*, II, 293-294.

³⁶ Azcarraga, *La libertad*, 114-115.

³⁷ Malo de Luque, *História política*, V, 233-234.

history. The remaining 44 years are covered in 7 pages. Azcarraga like Mas is dependent upon Comyn for the period after 1790. He tells of European goods smuggled into Manila by foreign European carriers after the Spanish king opened that port in 1789 to European ships bringing Asian produce.³⁸ Possibly Azcarraga draws this information from Mas, but it is clearly traceable to Comyn.³⁹ Also traceable to Comyn through Mas is Azcarraga's account of the establishment of agencies in China and India.⁴⁰ *La libertad* speaks of the continuance of the Manila call after 1803,⁴¹ and indeed, an official Company document also makes this claim.⁴² Nevertheless, the continuance of the Manila call should not be interpreted as a spirited Company effort to continue Philippine development. This call would not be for the purpose of procuring Philippine produce, nor would the transmission of merchandise by way of Manila fatten the Manila customs since duties would only have been imposed on goods sold in the Philippines.⁴³ Goods sold in the Philippines, by admission of Company officials, constituted only a negligible trade.⁴⁴ Azcarraga takes up the *Nueva real cédula* of 1803, and describes some of its provisions, but because his presentation is at variance with the data in the document, it is doubtful that the cédula itself was available to him.⁴⁵ He continues:

Los cálculos equivocados de los directores sobre los precios en que habrían de poder realizar los productos del país, que á tanto costo habían contratado, les ocasionaron grandes pérdidas principalmente en la pimienta.⁴⁶

This is an obvious reference to the comparison between Sumatram and Philippine prices provided by Mas and copied by Mallat. By Azcarraga's time, the failure of the essay of the Manila directors

³⁸ Azcarraga, *La libertad*, 142-143.

³⁹ Comyn, *Estado*, 70.

⁴⁰ See above p. 85.

⁴¹ Azcarraga, *La libertad*, 142.

⁴² *Exposición*, 1813, 102.

⁴³ *Nueva real cédula de la compañía de Filipinas de 12 de Julio de 1803*, Título IV, Artículo lix.

⁴⁴ Se. un tratado de Comercio y navegacion entre Las Comp^{as}. Inglesas y Español, ca. 1796, Ayer Collection, 9.

⁴⁵ *La libertad* dates the cédula 1805 while the actual date was 1803. Further, Azcarraga says that the war time permission to ship goods from Manila to Peru was extended by the king in the amount of 300,000 pesos annually, *La libertad* 142-143. This information could not have been drawn from Comyn who correctly states the value of war time shipment at 500,000 pesos annually, *Estado*, 69. It is possible, however, that permission was extended before 1803, in a lesser amount than reaffirmed and raised in the *Nueva real cédula... de 1803*.

⁴⁶ Azcarraga, *La libertad*, 145.

in pepper production had attained legendary stature. In immediate sequence, he takes up the native attitude toward the Company's methods:

los labradores parece tambien que se aprovecharon de los errores y larguezas de la Compañía y hubo el caso de una indígena que quedó mudo ó fingió estarlo, para no dar cuenta de un capital de ochenta mil duros, que por sus manos pasó para las de los cosecheros; nuestra misma legislación, que declaraba nula toda obligación consistente en anticipos hechos á los indígenas que escediera de cinco pesos, era un gran obstaculo que imposibilitando á la Sociedad de enjuiciar á sus acreedores, le daba las mas veces un resultado contrario al que se proponia en aquellos anticipos, y todos estos quebrantos no le permitieron repartir mas que cuatro dividendos activos en veinticinco años.⁴⁷

In the foregoing, the preoccupation of the Philippine-centric interpreters with the supposed importance of Philippine agriculture and internal development to the Company's general welfare is carried almost to the ultimate. The central thesis of the Philippine-centric view is that Company global success was somehow dependent upon the Company's rather limited effort within the Philippine Islands. With Azcarraga, the formation of this misinterpretation is proceeding apace—developed almost wholly from Malo de Luque's brief account of the early years and Comyn's truthful, if not objective, lament of Company failure *within the Islands*. Malo de Luque emphasizes Company efforts in Philippine agriculture as a Company contribution to Island welfare; Comyn bitterly regrets the Company's failure to make the Philippine venture pay; Mas attributes great loss of capital to the Company's pursuit of Philippine agriculture; Mallat copies; Azcarraga ascribes a diminution of dividends to Philippine agriculture. The fallacy of this line of development can be at least partially discerned in an examination of the founding cedula. Article L of that document requires the Company to invest 4 per cent of its profits in Philippine development; this investment was to depend upon estimated or realized profit, not vice versa as assumed by Azcarraga.⁴⁸ It is only a small step from Azcarraga's contention to the conclusion that the entire Company capital was swallowed up in the Philippines.

In 1878, seven years after the publication of Azcarraga's *La libertad*, José Felipe del Pan had published in Manila his *Las Islas*

⁴⁷ *Ibid.*

⁴⁸ See footnote 67.

Filipinas. Progresos en 70 años. Pan, the editor of *La revista de Filipinas* and a man intensely interested in Philippine development, republished Comyn's *Estado* as the first part of this work. The second part, by Pan, follows the categories imposed by Comyn and re-presents them in terms of the changes of seventy years. Pan is hostile to the theories of commerce held by Comyn and at times seems over-anxious to derogate Comyn's position as spokesman for the economic condition of the Islands. His treatment of the Company is harsh and his criticisms pointed, although he accepts previous interpretations uncritically. Yet, among the writers examined herein, Pan is the first to relate what appears to be first hand knowledge of Philippine agriculture to the problem of Company failure in that field.

Pan begins his commentary on the Royal Philippines Company by taking his final step in the development of the Philippine-centric theory. He boldly assumes that the Company's sole objective was the promotion of the Philippine economy, and naively but truculently states that the entire capitalization of the Company was wastefully and uselessly plowed into the Islands.⁴⁹ Pan follows with a brief analysis of the reasons for this supposed waste of capital. He emphasizes bad management in agriculture and, as a case in point, ridicules Company officials who invested money in an attempt to raise pepper in the Islands; Pan points out that the climate of the Philippines is not suited to pepper cultivation.⁵⁰ This fact seems to have escaped other commentators.

Pan's arguments are of conclusive importance to the development of the Philippine-centric approach to Company history. With the publication of Pan's *Progresos*, this misinterpretation has achieved an impressive list of backers—each contributing his portion and each making easier the path of future adherents. Such a list

⁴⁹ Pan, pp. 252-253. The exact statement is as follows: "Concediendo, en primer lugar, que los juicios *á posteriori* son fáciles, porque en apoyo de los argumentos aparece la suprema razón del éxito conocido; aun con esta salvedad, no podemos dispensarnos de presentar con todo desembarazo algunas reflexiones acerca de la marcha de los negocios de *La Compañía de Filipinas* que disponía de un capital de doce millones de pesos. Atendidas diferencias entre precios de jornales de entonces y ahora, así como de todas las cosas mas necesarias á la vida, aquel enorme capital equivalía á treinta millones de pesos hoy. ¡Que palanca tan poderosa de adelantos materiales! Asombra lo que, actualmente, con treinta millones de pesos, y á fines del pasado siglo con doce, se podría hacer bajo un plan meditado y dirección enérgica é inteligente, para la transformación económica de este país.

Pues bien: de *La Compañía de Filipinas*, que aquí gastó en para pérdida tan crecidos capitales, apenas queda huella por parte alguna."

was almost bound to impress an historian attempting to present a brief summary of the Royal Philippines Company in a broad survey of Philippine history. Such a writer was José Montero y Vidal.

In 1895, Montero published his *Historia general*.⁵¹ This brief account concentrates on Company organization, taken mostly from the founding cedula.⁵² This treatment is largely a paraphrasing of Azcarraga. On the period after 1790, Montero is less informative, and, in keeping with his predecessors, leaned heavily upon Tomás de Comyn. Azcarraga was not slighted: whole sentences were lifted, without direct citation, from *La libertad*, including that most respectful gesture of the plagiarist, the carefully copied mistake.⁵³ Montero's conclusions are a re-presentation of Pan with the scorn extracted.⁵⁴ In short, Montero drew together all contributors to the Philippine-centric interpretation. His footnotes are the roster of those treated in the foregoing; Malo de Luque, Comyn, Mallat, and Pan. Curiously, Azcarraga and Mas are not mentioned.

The latest published work of the Royal Philippines is that of Professor William Lytle Schurz.⁵⁵ Schurz begins his article with a documented narration of the first Spanish attempts at direct trade with Manila. Four pages are devoted to these preliminary attempts, then the author proceeds into an examination of Viana's *Memorial*. Three pages are devoted to Viana's charges and recommendations. In evaluating Viana's plea, Schurz states "we see that it was fortunate for Spain's hold on the islands that before the Mexican War of Independence they had been made immediately dependent on the government in the peninsula, and that direct communications had been established with them."⁵⁶ This is a part of the Philippine-centric view in that it broadly states that Company operations in the Philippines were of sufficient magni-

⁵⁰ *Ibid.*, 253.

⁵¹ *Historia general de Filipinas desde el descubrimiento de dichas islas hasta nuestros días*, II, Madrid, 1895.

⁵² *Ibid.*, 297-301.

⁵³ Montero uses Azcarraga's incorrect date for the *Nueva real cédula ... de 1803*, *Ibid.*, 304. See above footnote 45.

⁵⁴ *Ibid.*, 305-307.

⁵⁵ William Lytle Schurz, *The Manila Galleon*, New York, 1939; "The Royal Philippine Company," *Hispanic American Historical Review*, November, 1920, 491-508. The original article was abbreviated and appended to *The Manila Galleon* without the citations contained in the original. Nothing was added.

⁵⁶ Schurz, "The Royal Philippine Company," *HAHR*, November, 1920, 495-496.

tude to overcome an established economic dependence on New Spain that had been nurtured over a period of two hundred years by annual galleons between Acapulco and Manila. The concluding remarks of Schurz' article lend further support to the Philippine-centric theory.

The islands henceforth looked toward Spain and not toward Mexico, and this reorientation of the colony was in a large part the work of the Company. It marked the end of the long era which began with the expedition of Villalobos, and the beginning of the final epoch in the Spanish history of the islands.⁵⁷

Schurz passes from an examination of Viana to a narration of the early royal efforts at direct trade with the Islands. Azcarraga is cited as the source for information on the arrival at Manila of a royal vessel, the *Buen Consejo*, prior to the formation of the Company.⁵⁸ In amplification of Manilan opposition to the Company, the author tells of the unwillingness of the city's merchants to participate in any new venture; Montero is cited.⁵⁹ The article continues for four pages with the establishment of the Company and a description of its composition taken mostly from the founding cedula. Immediately thereafter, Schurz returns to the problem of Manilan opposition to the Company.⁶⁰ Schurz evidences a strong reliance on Mallat by including a quotation from the latter in his verifying footnote. Schurz concludes his treatment of Manilan resentment against the Company with the statement that the Company promoters were conscious of the "... little chance of success the company would have in the face of this opposition."⁶¹ A page and a half is then devoted to the provisions of the founding cedula which were composed with an eye to Manilan objections. The implication is clear. Company success was dependent upon Company achievement within the Islands. In logical order, Schurz next takes up the Company failure in Philippine agriculture. He presents the opinion of Fedor Jagor that this failing was due to lack of royal provision for impressed native labor.⁶² Jagor, like Mallat, was a traveller who visited the Philippines, read Comyn

⁵⁷ *Ibid.*, 508.

⁵⁸ *Ibid.*, 497.

⁵⁹ *Ibid.*

⁶⁰ *Ibid.*, 501, citing Pedro Calderón Enríquez to Arriaga, A de I, 108-3-18 and Mallat, *Les Philippines*, II, 293.

⁶¹ *Ibid.*, 501.

⁶² *Ibid.*, 503, citing Fedor Jagor, *Viaje por Filipinas*, translated from the German, Madrid, 1875, 13.

and perhaps Malo de Luque, and returned home to write. Jagor's judgment was neither new nor carefully considered; it was drawn from Comyn's *Estado*.⁶³

The material presented in "The Royal Philippine Company" concerning the Company's duties in Island development is taken largely from the founding cedula with additional information from the *Exposición* of 1813.⁶⁴ Schurz begins his treatment of Company commerce on the fourteenth page of his article, concludes in two paragraphs, and then devotes three pages to the reasons for the Company's passing.⁶⁵ Overall, the article assumes a familiar aspect. Of the eighteen pages of the paper, only four deal with the period after 1790, and of these, three are taken up with the Company's decline. With the exceptions of Comyn's brief, insular comments and Schurz' information on Company operations in Mexico, the history of the Royal Philippine Company remains as Eduardo Malo de Luque left it with the publication of the fifth volume of his *História política* in 1790.

Although mistaken, this Philippine-centric view of the Company has a ready appearance of proportioned judgement. At first it would appear no less than logical that a trade organization bearing the name "Philippines," and seemingly designed to unite the Philippine Islands with Spain would feature the same Islands as its focus of activity. A perusal of documents and published works in the Ayer Collection of the Newberry Library reveals the Philippine-centric theory to be a *non sequitur*.

Because of Malo de Luque's pre-eminent position in the writing of Company history, any re-examination of the Company must begin with him. This author's textual neglect of extra-Philippine aspects of Company commerce may be explained in two ways. First, the Royal Philippines Company was heralded in Spain as a new Oriental venture.⁶⁶ Consequently, Malo de Luque's readers

⁶³ Comyn, *Estado*, 12. Speaking of early success in silk production, Comyn laments the lack of enforced labor. "...y son incalculables los felices resultados que se habrian seguido de plan tan vasto, y principiado con tanto vigor, si hubiese podido continuarse con igual teson por su sucesor, y no hubiese sido de una vez destruida la obra por equivocada humanidad con que se procedió poco despues de la partida del señor Basco, exonerándose al indio de ser aplicado á cultivo alguno que no fuese plenamente espontáneo, en conformidad, según se pretendia, con el espíritu general de nuestra legislación indiana."

⁶⁴ *Exposición*, 1813.

⁶⁵ Schurz, "The Royal Philippine Company," *HAHR*, November, 1920, 495-496.

⁶⁶ Valentín de Foronda, "Disertación Sobre la nueva Compañía," in *Miscelanea*, Madrid, 1787.

would have been interested in a presentation of Oriental affairs—viewing operations in other quarters as uninterestingly ordinary. Second, Malo de Luque, the Duke of Almodóvar, may have had a financial interest in the Company. If Malo de Luque was an investor in the new Company, the wording of the founding cedula makes the reason for his emphasis on Island development readily apparent. All privileges and exemptions granted by the king to the Company were dependent upon a Company investment of 4 per cent of its annual net profit in Philippine internal development.⁶⁷ The initial desire of the king was, therefore, that the Islands should prosper with the Company. In the early years of Company history, the official Company position was, of course, that the Islands were prospering with the Company. Certainly this theme is carried out in the *Exposición* of 1813, directed to "*las Cortes generales y extraordinarias de la nación*."⁶⁸ Over 35 of the *Exposición's* 124 pages are devoted to the chronicling of the Philippine endeavor.⁶⁹ Not only does this Company document pursue the tenor of Malo de Luque, but frequently quotes the latter in defense of Company privilege.⁷⁰ Again there arises the question as to the relationship of Malo de Luque to the Company.

⁶⁷ *Real cédula... de 10 de Marzo, de 1785*, Artículo L states: "Todas estas gracias, privilegios y extenciones tan ventajosas á la Compañía, y el crecido interés que he tomado en sus acciones, han tenido en me Real ánimo el preferente objeto del bien general de mis amados vasallos, y que se fomenten la agricultura é industria de las Islas Filipinas. Y como su prosperidad refluye en beneficio de las operaciones de este comercio, y que sus progresos tienen íntimo enlace con los de la Compañía, cuya utilidad será mayor, quanto mas se aumenten los frutos y las artes en aquellos dominios: declaro que la he concedido, y debe gozar de las franquicias contenidas en los artículos anteriores, con la precisa calidad de aplicar un quatro por ciento del producto libre de sus ganancias anuales, para destinarlo con su misma intervención al fomento de las Filipinas en los dos ramos de agricultura, é industria, y que á este fin la Junta de gobierno, que se formará en Manila, propondrá todo lo que tenga por conveniente á la de esta corte, para que examinado con el zelo, madurez y pulso que exige un asunto de tanto importancia, resuelva lo que le parezca mas conducente al adelantamiento de dichas ramos, y me de cuenta de sus acuerdos, para que se observen con mi Soberana aprobación."

⁶⁸ *Exposición*, 1813. The governing body of the Company was appealing to a hostile Cortes, an assembly opposed to privilege and monopoly, for an extension of the Company's special graces. With the monarchy in temporary eclipse, royal favor was of no avail. This *Exposición* is a recitation of Company services to the state with emphasis on the aid to the Philippines required in the founding cedula. This aid had, by 1813, been long a dead issue, but, in an effort to present the Company's record to the Cortes in the best possible light, the discontinuance of Philippine investment is not denied, but deliberately obscured.

⁶⁹ *Ibid.*, 36-75.

⁷⁰ *Ibid.*, 57-75.

The *Exposición* of 1813, then, is a defense of Company privilege and monopoly characterized by a zealous description of the areas wherein the Company had complied with royal demands. Professor Hussey's generalization applies particularly to the Royal Philippines Company. "The practice of monopoly always faced the need of itself granting privilege and laboring outside its chosen field, in order to retain ministerial favor."⁷¹ The portion of the *Exposición* of 1813 devoted to Philippine trade and agriculture was an attempt on the part of the Company to convince the government that no stone had been left unturned in the quest for Island prosperity. Thus is evidenced the natural corollary to the duties of monopoly—the necessity to inform the government of every minute compliance with ministerial wishes. The total expenditure in Philippine agriculture to 1802, is listed at 2,300,473 *reales de vellón*, 25 maravedís in the *Exposición* of 1813.⁷² This figure assumes considerable importance in its relationship to the investment in Philippine development demanded by the founding cedula. The *Exposición* of 1813 mentions declared dividends of twenty-seven per cent.⁷³ Converting this percentage into *reales de vellón* reveals that the investment in Philippine agriculture exceeded the required four per cent of profit, a fact which, no doubt, the Company officials wished to make abundantly clear to the government auditors. Ultimately, this listed investment denotes irrecoverable capital, *i.e.*, losses to the Royal Philippines Company in Philippine agriculture. Actual expenditures in the Islands, of course, far exceeded this amount. Malo de Luque reports that in the first five years, the Company disbursed in the Philippines an amount in excess of seventeen million *reales de vellón*, over three million of which were involved in agricultural purchases.⁷⁴ These expenditures, large even in relation to the total capitalization of the Company, do not represent a loss.

The foregoing material from the *Exposición* of 1813 is not found in the writings of Mas, Mallat, Azcarraga, Pan, or Montero, and it may be assumed that the *Exposición* was either not available in the Islands or were overlooked by these authors. Only Schurz, of the writers contributing to the Company bibliography, cites it and he does not employ its statement of total Philippine investment

⁷¹ Hussey, *Caracas Company*, 300.

⁷² *Exposición* 1813, 56.

⁷³ *Ibid.*, 85.

⁷⁴ Malo de Luque, V, 362–363, citing Manila directors to the Captain-General, November 18, 1788.

in his estimate of Company losses in the Islands. Moreover, the investment did not increase in the years following 1802. An *Exposición* directed to the Cortes by the Company's Madrid Junta in 1821, lists the same investment or loss in the Philippines.⁷⁵ The true position of the Philippine Islands in Company commerce at the conclusion of five years is found in the *Plan general* of Malo de Luque. Historians who have cited him but continued in the Philippine-centric interpretation, have either failed in their understanding of the *Plan general* or have neglected it altogether.

The *Plan general* is an enclosure bound in with the fifth volume of the *Historia política* and designated *pieza* three.⁷⁶ It opens as a single sheet approximating the area of six or eight pages of the same book. Its totality comprises the most useful and detailed presentation of Company commerce possible in so small a space. Capitalization is covered in broad categories, including amounts forthcoming from various merchant guilds, banks, and individual subscribers, along with the source and interest rates of borrowed capital. All voyages, points of arrival and departure, national origin of cargo, value, and taxes were recorded along with the value of sales and realized profit on each category of delivered merchandise. Succinctly, enough information is provided for a broad cost analysis.

While the dependence of the Royal Philippines Company on the declining Caracas Company is well known, some details of this dependence will be pertinent at this point. The holdings of the Caracas Company in the Americas on the eve of the conversion of these assets to the new venture exceeded thirty-four million *reales de vellón*.⁷⁷ Further, the directorate of the Royal Philippines Com-

⁷⁵ *Exposición dirigida a las Cortes por Junta de gobierno de la compañía de Filipinas, acompañada de la Consulta hecha á varios juri-consultos célebres de España, Holand é Inglaterra, y de las dictámenes de éstos acerca del derecho que tiene las accionistas, con arreglo á la Constitución y a las leyes, para exigir la indemnización competente, por haber sido anulado, cinco años ántes del plazo convenido, el pacto solemne que se contiene en el real Cédula o Patente temporal, que servió de base al establecimiento de la Compañía, Madrid, 1821.*

⁷⁶ *Plan general que comprehende los capitales con que girado, y el comercio que ha hecho la real compañía de Filipinas, desde su establecimiento en primero de Julio de 1785, hasta 30 de Septiembre de 1789, con expresión de la clase de efectos en que ha negociado, sus Derechos y Gastos, Ventas, Existencias, y resultados que ha producido hasta el mismo día, á saber, in Malo de Luque, V, pieza, 3, 95.*

⁷⁷ Hussey, *Caracas Company*, 294, citing *Resumen general de la liquidación... de la Real Compañía, (1787), A. de I., 108-5-7.*

pany was identical with that of the terminating Caracas Company.⁷⁸ The transfer to the new company of the incumbent directors along with so large a portion of American holdings allows the inference that the old trade would not be abandoned—that it might be relied upon heavily by men experienced in it and unfamiliar with the new tack of the Asian venture. This inference receives corroboration in the following analysis of the *Plan general*.

To begin with, the course or routing of the Company's Oriental trade must be fully understood. A ship leaving Spain laden with domestic and foreign European manufactured goods and Spanish silver, would call at designated ports in South America, discharge the major portion of the finished products, take aboard American produce, and proceed to Manila with the newly acquired cargo and the bulk of the original silver. At Manila, the silver would be exchanged for Oriental produce which had arrived in foreign bottoms. These goods usually passed through the hands of the Manilans, producing prosperity in the city. The fully laden ship would then return to Spain by way of the Cape or the Horn with no further exchanges. There was to be no direct traffic between Asia and the Americas. With the exception of minor quantities of American produce disposed of in the Philippines, all goods handled by Company ships passed through Spain. Tariff adjustments and benefits were allowed the Company on trans-shipment of Asian goods from Spain to the Americas, but Spain remained the center of trade.

By September 30, 1789, the gross transactions of the Company amounted to 469,768,318 *reales de vellón*. From this is deducted the money involved in ships, warehouses, and administrative buildings, leaving the gross figure for current transactions at 429,345,755 *reales de vellón*. Also, silver carriage and merchandise carriage are undifferentiated; the divisions of trade are examined in terms of money value.

Exports to the Philippines constituted 28 per cent of the total commerce and produced 1 per cent of the gross profit. Imports from the Orient made up 29 per cent of the gross transactions and provided 21 per cent of the gross profit. The low profit on the outbound segment of the Asian trade was due to the fact that it was, for the most part, a one way carriage of Spanish silver. The Oriental branch of Company commerce, therefore, accounted for

⁷⁸ *Ibid.*, 297-298, citing Extracto de los Acuerdos de la Junta General ... 22 de Marzo de 1785, A. de I., 108-5-7.

57 per cent of the gross transactions by value and yielded 22 per cent of the gross profit. The fact that the Oriental branch of trade consumed the greater portion of the investment is, of course, in complete accord with the royal intent to develop Asian trade. An examination of the Company's American trade, however, reveals that the directors had not lost their skill in familiar fields.

Exports to the Americas, to 1789, made up 31 per cent of the gross transactions and produced 63 per cent of the gross profits. Asian merchandise in this outgoing leg of American trade constituted less than 2 per cent of cargo value. Consequently, this tremendous profit was not in any way dependent upon the influx of goods from the Pacific. Imports from the Americas accounted for only 12 per cent of the gross transactions and supplied 15 per cent of the gross profit. The most important facet of this analysis is that the known and established American trade was producing more than three quarters of the Company's profit while consuming less than half of the investment. The Oriental venture, on the other hand, produced less than half as much profit while requiring slightly larger investment. The Company directors were not, as assumed by adherents to the Philippine-centric interpretation, pouring money into the Philippines without a buffer in a more profitable area. Further, of the 29 voyages completed to 1789, 20 were solely in the American trade, and of the out-bound voyage.⁷⁹ The low profits in the import branch of Oriental trade was probably due to the novelty of the venture along with Comyn's "*mal extendido sistema*." The latter, that is the acquisition of all Oriental goods at Manila, exposed the Company to the rapacity of foreign carriers and Manilan middle-men, increasing the cost of goods 80 per cent, according to Comyn.⁸⁰ As previously stated, Comyn is lamenting a loss of profit while Mas and others in the

⁷⁹ These findings, drawn and deduced from the *Plan general*, are not obvious and cannot be discerned at a glance. Perhaps this is an additional reason why other writers have shunned it. A case in point is the number of voyages initiated and completed to 1789. Under "deliveries" (*envios*), the *Plan general* lists forty voyages initiated: 21 to Caracas, Maracaybo, and Nueva España; 9 to Lima and Buenos Aires; 10 to Manila. Under "returns" (*retornos*), however, the *Plan general* lists 29 completed voyages: 9 from Manila; 20 from Caracas and Maracaybo. These figures indicate that 9 round voyages had been made to Manila from Spain with 9 calls at Buenos Aires or Lima. The tenth vessel, dispatched in 1789, had not yet completed its trip. Therefore, the 9 voyages to Lima and Buenos Aires are actually part of the 10 voyages to Manila. Whatever the cost accounting value of listing 40 voyages in the *Plan general*, the actual voyages initiated to 1789 did not exceed 30.

⁸⁰ Comyn, *Estado*, 65.

Philippine-centric lineage assume a loss of capital. The *Exposición* of 1813 states that in Spain, 24 per cent of the sale price of Chinese goods and 44 per cent of the sale price of Indian goods were due to the Manila routing.⁸¹ While the Manila routing, then, was occasioning no loss, the inroads on profit could scarcely have been countenanced by an alert directorate. Given such circumstances, it would have been indeed unusual if the Company directors had not taken steps to eliminate Manila from the Company itinerary.

Unfortunately for those who relied upon Malo de Luque and Comyn for their narration of Company history, the former wrote too early to be aware of the abandonment of Manila by Company shipping and the latter obscures the actual train of events in treating the establishment of Company agencies in China and India. The *Exposición* of 1813, with its emphasis on the performance of Company duties to the crown, assumes the new routing without mentioning a specific date.⁸² With more precision, an extract of the first meeting of shareholders in the Royal Philippines Company dated 1793, reveals that many abrogations of the founding cedula were granted in the early years.⁸³ This "Extracto de la primera Junta General" lists among these special amendments the permission to by-pass Manila in Oriental trade and the permission to discontinue the investment of 4 per cent of profit in Philippine internal development. Not only had the Madrid directors secured royal permission to remove Manila from their trade routes, but permission to remove the Philippines from their expense accounts as well. The abandonment of Manila occurred before the Napoleonic conflicts deprived Spain of access to her overseas dominions, and the failure of the Company to maintain direct relations between Spain and the Philippines cannot be directly attributed to those wars. Without question, these wars did affect the later shaping of Company commerce, but the initial abandonment of Manila as the Oriental terminus of trade stemmed from the fact that routing goods through Manila resulted in a loss of profit to the Company. Of course, the official position of the Company in its correspondence with the government was to overlook the abandonment and cling to the fiction that Manila was still served.⁸⁴

⁸¹ *Exposición* 1813, 80.

⁸² *Ibid.*, 97-98, 102.

⁸³ Extracto de a primera Junta General de la Real Compañía de Filipinas celebrada en los días 9 de Septiembre de 1791, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, y 20 de Marzo de 92, 16 de Julio de 93, Madrid, 1793; Ayer Collection.

⁸⁴ *Exposición*, 1813, 102.

Prior to 1790, the Company dispatched 12 ships to Manila.⁸⁵ Between 1790 and 1813, only 20 additional voyages were made to the Orient, and of this number, not all called at Manila.⁸⁶ Only 20 ships according to a Philippine observer, came to Manila directly from Spain in the 40 years preceding 1820.⁸⁷ If we deduct from this figure the 12 Company ships that arrived prior to 1790, the last of the royal voyages in direct trade made by the *Asunción* in 1783 and 1784, the 1780 and 1782 expeditions carried out by the Five Major Merchant Guilds of Madrid, and the voyage sponsored by an independent house in the same period, we are left with a total of 4 direct voyages from Spain to Manila between the date of permission to by-pass it and 1820.⁸⁸ Thus, with the 12 voyages known and the 4 deduced, we have a tentative total of 16 direct voyages made by Company vessels in the years between 1785 and 1820. These voyages could hardly have affected a "reorientation of the colony" toward Spain and away from Mexico, as concluded Professor Schurz. This becomes particularly apparent when we realize the overall reduction of the Company effort within the Islands after the initial years. In 1803, the Manila Junta or administrative board was discontinued and the duties of the Company agents in the Islands reduced to preparing war time shipments to Peru, shipment of money to Oriental agencies, and the collection of Island produce for domestic sale.⁸⁹

As previously stated, the final figure for Company loss in the Philippines was 2,300,473 *reales*, 25 maravedís.⁹⁰ The *Exposiciones* of 1813 and 1821, directed to the Spanish government by the Madrid Junta in defense of Company privilege, attempt to paint a picture of faithful and arduous service in the national interest, but the permission to cease investment severely injures the sincerity of these Company complaints. The exact date that the Company ceased to invest money in Philippine internal development is difficult to determine, but a loosely defined figure set against estimated profits in the *Plan general* opens the possibility that the

⁸⁵ *Plan general; Exposición*, 1813, 18.

⁸⁶ *Exposición*, 1813, 19.

⁸⁷ Manuel Bernáldez Pizarro, *Dictamen sobre las causas que se oponen á la seguridad y Fomento de las Yslas Filipinas*, [Manila], 1821; Ayer Collection.

⁸⁸ The respective citations for these voyages are as follows: *Exposición*, 1813, 83; Malo de Luque, V, 318; *Exposición*, 1813, 4-5.

⁸⁹ *Nueva real cédula de la compañía...1803*, Título III, Artículo xxxvi.

⁹⁰ *Exposición*, 1813, 56; *Exposición dirigida a las Cortes...*, 1821, 14.

major portion of the investment had been made prior to December, 1788.

Examination of the *Plan general* reveals that all expenses of overhead, official salaries, maintainance, etc., are charged directly to the expense of expeditions, apparently through the ordinary method of pro-rating employed by present day businesses. Only two exceptions are made to this presentation of expenses: a loss involved in the supply of slaves to the Americas and 2,190,583 reales, 18 maravedís in expenditures of "undetermined application." The latter bears a close numerical resemblance to the known total loss in the Islands. The significance of this expenditure of "undetermined application" lies in its listing with an enterprise initiated at royal command, that is, slave traffic. Philippine investment, another royal command, could not logically have been pro-rated over the expenses of Oriental voyages because to do so would obscure the amount invested, a procedure that would almost certainly meet with the king's disapproval.⁹¹ Therefore, the separate listing of this expense and its separate deduction from estimated profits lead well to the tentative conclusion that 2,190,583 reales, 18 maravedís constituted the then to-date investment in Philippine internal development. This would mean that by December, 1788, less than 100,000 *reales*, the difference between the figure of "undetermined application" and the figure for final loss in the Islands, remained to be spent in Philippine internal development.⁹² The royal permission to discontinue Philippine development prior to 1793, together with the expense of "undetermined application" indicate that the Company's Philippine investments ceased between the fourth and eighth year of Company existence.⁹³ The permission to cease and the probable cessation of investment preceded the declaration of the first dividends in 1793.⁹⁴ The removal of Manila from the Company's routes would also have come before 1793. The Company investments in internal development and Philippine trade,

⁹¹ *Real cédula...de 10 de Marzo de 1785*, Artículo VI reveals the king's mistrust of certain accounting abuses by enjoining clarity in book-keeping. Further, Artículo L, see footnote 67, would, by its provisions for determining the exact amount of Philippine investment, presumably make prorating or any other type of apportioning illegal.

⁹² The *Plan general* limits its presentation of Philippine information to December, 1788.

⁹³ It is doubtful that the re-imposition of the 4 per cent requirement in 1803 (*Nueva real cédula...de 1803*, Título III, Artículo xlii) would have had any effect on the Company or the Philippines, inasmuch as only one dividend was declared after that date; *Exposición* 1813, 85.

⁹⁴ Extracto de la primera Junta General...1793, Ayer Collection.

therefore, hardly exceeded the moderate demands of the king or financial self-interest. The inevitable conclusions are that the Company was not destroyed in the Philippines and that the Philippines were, in fact, abandoned by the Company. It is in their failure to understand this that Philippine-centric interpreters of Company history have made their error.

The narrow and parochial confines to which former writers have relegated the Royal Philippine Company do violence to the ecumenical character of the organization. The Philippines constituted a diminutive portion of the Company's scope, and concentration on this particular area neglects the carriage of slaves from Africa to South America, fabrication of metal containers for the Mexican mines, manufacture of moslem caps for Near Eastern trade, procurement of weapons for the Spanish army, and, most important of all, a vigorous American trade which produced the major share of Company profit.⁹⁵ The directors of the Company were merchants engaged in a world wide search for profit, not messiahs with a Philippine fixation. The new context for the Company, then, is the world and with the next context come additional areas for scholarly investigation.

Certainly, the microcosm, the Philippines, deserves a better history than it has so far achieved. Numerous questions remain unanswered. What was at the root of Manilan opposition to the Company? Certainly not Malo de Luque's one sided appraisal of colonial ignorance that echoes and re-echoes through the writings surveyed in this paper. What of the Company efforts in Philippine provinces? What of the "silent war" which Pan says the *alcaldes* waged against the Company? Examination of pertinent materials in the Ayer Collection leaves this writer with the impression that administrative affairs in agriculture were left to men more suited to account keeping than exploitation of the soil. This inference is tentative and is merely suggested as a line of inquiry. It is possible that archival records in Manila could answer these questions.

The broader facet of world trade demands a major share of attention. Five decades of voyages strung across two hemispheres cannot be telescoped into several paragraphs without distortion. Further, the important question of Company purpose remains unanswered. What is meant by "the union of American and Oriental

⁹⁵ *Exposición*, 1813, 32-33.

commerce" as set forth in the founding cedula? A cost analysis of the *Plan general* leaves strong indications that the Company was predicated on a mercantilistic premise almost passé even in Spain. Solid documentation is, however, preferable to the extrapolations of cost accounting, and so any generalizations in this vein must await further research.

On the peninsula, greater knowledge of the opposition of merchants and industrial interests to certain of the Company's retailing and import privileges would undoubtedly shed much light on the welfare of the Company during the rule of the Cortes. The Archivo General de la Nación at Caracas, Venezuela would certainly provide information on the American aspect of the Company traffic, particularly with regard to that trade which the Company inherited from the Caracas Company. In brief, the history of the Company is not yet written. The re-orientation attempted in this paper barely scratches the surface of the subject. Within the United States, there is little documentary material available. Thirty-five pages of manuscript, unexamined by this writer, pertaining to the Company are in the Library of Congress, and would undoubtedly assist in the general problem of Company history. Elsewhere, Roland Dennis Hussey, author of the *Caracas Company*, has stated privately that he has in his possession some documentation on the Company. Ultimately, the completion of the writing of the history of the Company will depend upon the records in the Archivo General de Indias in Seville, Spain.

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The Making of an Insurgent

The Congressional career of George W. Norris substantiates the premise that some liberals are gradually molded by political circumstances. To develop adequately this theme would take far more space than is available, therefore I have chosen to discuss a segment of it: Norris' relations with Speaker Joseph G. Cannon up to the insurgency revolt in March, 1910, when the Speaker's power was curtailed by his removal from membership on the Rules Committee. The term "insurgent," as I use it, connotes a Member of the House of Representatives who opposed the tremendous power granted Speaker Cannon by the rules. Many insurgents later became known as progressives, a term which did not come into widespread use until late 1910 or early 1911; other insurgents never were identified with the progressive cause. In short, insurgency referred to the procedural matter of revising the rules of the House, and the Republican members of Congress who desired this reform favored it for a variety of reasons, some of which will be commented upon in the course of this paper.

When Norris was elected to Congress in 1902 regular Republicans throughout Nebraska had reason to rejoice. He had redeemed the Fifth Congressional District, encompassing eighteen counties in south-western Nebraska, from Populist-Democratic control. Republican politicians and officials of the Burlington railroad, whose main line ran through the district, congratulated Norris, who had been able to call upon both groups for help during the campaign.

Defeating his opponent by less than two hundred votes, Norris realized the necessity of hard work, if the district were to remain in the Republican fold. Eager to succeed in his new position, he willingly accepted the advice of Senator Charles H. Dietrich, who had taken him "under his wing" during the campaign. It was Dietrich who suggested that Norris seek membership on the Committee on Public Buildings and Grounds in the 58th Congress. The Senator thought that a Nebraskan on this committee would make the state's delegation one of the most powerful with members strategically located on key committees.¹ Norris, for his part,

¹ C. H. Dietrich to G. W. Norris, December 4, 1902. George W. Norris Papers, Manuscripts Division, Library of Congress. All manuscript citations are from this collection.

understood that membership on the Committee on Public Buildings and Grounds might insure his continued service in Congress. Through "log-rolling" he could make certain that Nebraska and his congressional district in particular would be included in every bill the committee approved for the construction of post-offices, court-houses and other federal buildings. He eagerly sought this assignment and considered himself fortunate when the newly chosen Speaker of the House placed him on the committee.²

Shortly after his election Norris wrote to Cannon and then in February, 1903, he had made his first trip to Washington to ask Cannon for this committee assignment. Cannon was polite and even cordial to Norris but refused to commit himself. He claimed that until the 58th Congress convened he was merely a member and not Speaker of the House.³ When Cannon finally acceded to his request, Norris was delighted. He assumed, along with many of his friends in Nebraska, that he was in the Speaker's good graces. Indeed, throughout most of the Roosevelt years Norris would proclaim his support of both Theodore Roosevelt and Joseph G. Cannon and see nothing incongruous in that position.

Actually, it is only with the benefit of hindsight that Norris' position might appear incongruous. Roosevelt and Cannon, though not cast in the same political mold, had a begrudging respect for one another, and owing to the President's efforts they worked exceedingly well together most of the time. Cannon's advice and opinions were sought by the President and taken into consideration; on the other hand, Roosevelt's legislative program, until the very end of his presidency, rarely ran into difficulty in the House of Representatives. Important measures received the approval of the lower chamber with the precision of a well-oiled machine; the controversial Railroad Rate Bill, for example, passed the House with less than a dozen votes cast against it. The developing breach in the Republican party was not nearly so evident in the lower chamber as it was in the Senate where administrative measures frequently met powerful opposition. To George W. Norris, a very minor member of Congress and a devoted follower of Theodore Roosevelt, both the Speaker and the President seemed to function

² Norris to E. J. Burkett, December 9, 1902; Norris to Charles F. Manderson, December 9, 1902; Norris to Joseph G. Cannon, September 15, 1903.

³ Norris to Joseph G. Cannon, September 15, 1903.

as members of a well-disciplined team and he was proud of his connection with it.

Furthermore, during his early years in Congress Norris had an additional reason to be grateful for his growing friendship with "Uncle Joe." In the 1904 campaign Cannon spoke on Norris' behalf in the Fifth Congressional District. Easily re-elected, Norris expressed his appreciation to the Speaker:

Your position is the second one in the nation, and the confidence that all have in you has made many votes for the Republican ticket all over our country, because it has been recognized that Republican success meant the retention of yourself in that high and honorable position.⁴

There is no evidence to indicate at this time that he considered the Speaker's great power a threat to representative government. If the rules of the House were arbitrary and not entirely to his liking, the fault, Norris felt, lay in the large and unwieldy size of the membership and not in the power of the Speaker. Limitations in debate he considered necessary and he also accepted without reservation the seniority system which accentuated his insignificance in legislative matters.⁵

Meanwhile, Norris was winning recognition as an able and rising member of the House. Though a partisan Republican, his partisanship was neither emotional nor extreme. On occasion he spoke and voted against party measures which he felt were opposed to the interests of his constituents. These deviations from the Republican party line did not noticeably damage his standing with the Speaker or the party organization. Indeed, at the outset of the 59th Congress, Cannon placed him on an additional committee, Labor, and Norris continued to serve on it throughout the 60th Congress. Yet it was during the 60th Congress (March, 1907, to March, 1909) that Norris began to give serious attention to the rules and procedures by which Cannon exercised his authority. Before the session was concluded he was to present a resolution designed to deprive the Speaker of some of his power.

In October, 1907, in response to an inquiry from Congressman E. A. Hayes of California, Norris for the first time committed himself to favoring a change in the House rules. Possibly influenced by the example of the President in pursuing more liberal policies, Norris did this at a time when his standing in the Republican party

⁴ Norris to Joseph G. Cannon, November 14, 1904.

⁵ Norris to Eugene Allen, June 5, 1906.

both in Nebraska and in Congress was secure and unchallenged. The Committee on Rules, he explained, should be expanded and elected by the House instead of being appointed by the Speaker, though Norris doubted whether such a change could ever be effected. The rules could best be changed at the initial party caucus of a new Congress. At this caucus, Norris observed, the new members would most likely follow the leadership of those in positions of party power. Thus any change not favored by these men would probably fail. It was the caucus system that was at the basis of the Speaker's power.⁶ Though Norris later was instrumental in depriving the Speaker of his authority to choose the Rules Committee, he knew that this reform to be meaningful would have to be followed by the destruction of the party caucus.

Despite having committed himself against the power of the Speaker, Norris and other insurgents conducted no prolonged battle during the first session of the 60th Congress. The Panic of 1907 and the forthcoming national election precluded any open party strife. However, Norris courageously let it be known what he intended to do, if the opportunity ever arose. On May 16, 1908, he introduced a resolution providing that all standing committees be appointed by the Committee on Rules.⁷ A new committee, consisting of 15 members selected by the House from different geographical groups, would replace the existing one. The resolution was sent to the Committee on Rules to be disposed of by its chairman, Joseph G. Cannon. It was the identical resolution that Norris presented in March, 1910, when he precipitated the historic struggle which deprived the Speaker of his membership on this Committee. Norris, in effect, on May 16, 1908, warned the Speaker to be on his guard lest he be outmanoeuvred.

Since Roosevelt would soon leave the White House and since Cannon nourished presidential ambitions, the Speaker emerged during this session as a leading conservative critic of the President's program. Members who supported Roosevelt policies now saw Speaker Cannon in another light. With the aid of critical journalists, jovial, cigar-smoking "Uncle Joe" soon emerged as the "Tyrant from Illinois" and the "Arch-foe of Insurgency."⁸ Norris, in the Insurgent camp, had good reason to hope that his constituents,

⁶ Norris to E. A. Hayes, October 9, 1907.

⁷ *Congressional Record*: Sixtieth Congress, First Session, 6440.

⁸ Quotes are titles of two recent studies of Cannon: Blair Bolles, *Tyrant from Illinois*, New York, 1951, William R. Gwinn, *Uncle Joe Cannon: Archfoe of Insurgency*, New York, 1957.

who recently had endorsed a comprehensive state-wide program of administrative reform, would approve his action.⁹ He entered the 1908 campaign, one of the most difficult of his entire career, committed to a position from which there was no turning back—at least as long as Cannon was Speaker.

As Norris well understood, his resolution exposed him to the displeasure of the Speaker and most of the party leaders in Congress. It put him "out of the shadow of their approval" and promised to make his life and work in Washington most disagreeable. It meant too that almost all of the "favors and courtesies" extended to other Congressmen would be denied him.¹⁰ Hereafter Norris would have to place principle above party. And his continuance in public life depended upon the ability of his constituents to understand this situation.

Though Norris was aware of the long-range implications of his position, his constituents in 1908 seemingly were satisfied. During the campaign it was widely endorsed; indeed, he had to explain why he had been friendly to the Speaker and had not opposed him earlier. He stressed that the rules and not the men were basically at fault.

The 1908 campaign, which saw Bryan and the Democrats sweep Nebraska if not the nation, was one of the meanest and most malicious in which he had ever participated. His opponent, supplied with a seemingly inexhaustible checking account, often disregarded the truth. Furthermore, the Republican organization was more of a hindrance than a help. Among other things, necessary funds were withheld until late in the campaign. Throughout September and early October Norris had remained at home subject to the call of the state organization to speak throughout Nebraska. But the call never came and much precious time was lost. Five days after the election, he finally obtained figures that revealed his reelection to Congress for a fourth term by a margin of twenty-two votes.¹¹

⁹ The Thirtieth session of the Nebraska legislature had enacted among other items a primary law, a child labor act, an anti-free pass law and other railroad regulatory measures. The state now emerged as one of the few that had taken measures, as an editorial in the *Omaha Bee*, April 7, 1907, stated, "to supplement the work of Congress under the direction of President Roosevelt to the end of relieving the people of Nebraska of railroad domination in politics."

¹⁰ Norris to E. F. Baldwin, May 28, 1908; Norris to George Allen, June 22, 1908.

¹¹ Norris had 20,649 votes to 20,627 for Fred W. Ashton, his opponent.

There is no doubt that the 1908 campaign played an important role in the development of his insurgency and political independence. While Norris was manifesting his independence of party machinery in the House of Representatives, his experience in 1908 convinced him of the wisdom of conducting campaigns with a minimum of coordination with the Republican organization. It is also clear that his insurgency developed gradually and that there was no single incident that was responsible for it, though Norris and his biographers cite specific instances to the contrary.¹² In the course of my research in the *Record* and the Norris papers I have not been able to corroborate their examples, which are based largely on magazine articles written by Norris in the 1920's.¹³ The fact that he represented a political "burnt-over" district which since his arrival in Nebraska in the late 1880's had supported all shades of opinion from respectable Republicanism to belligerent Bryanism, possibly made his position easier. But basic to the success of the role he was to enact was the personality, courage and integrity of the man himself. Unassuming, modest but straightforward, presenting facts and discussing issues sometimes for hours on end, relying on the friendship of a small band of faithful followers and without a political machine to aid him, Norris was able over a period of years to gain and hold the respect of the voters. While other candidates might indulge in personalities and add emotional fervor to the issues they raised, Norris presented reason and logic with the probity of a country judge.

Following his reelection Norris prepared to attack the rules once the second session of the 60th Congress convened on December 7, 1908. But the sudden illness of one of his daughters prevented his presence on December 11, when the insurgents, whose membership at this time fluctuated between 25 and 30, gathered in the Interstate and Foreign Commerce Committee Room at the call of William Peters Hepburn of Iowa, who after twenty-two years of distinguished service, had just been defeated for reelection. Hepburn performed a service similar to that of Robert M. LaFollette in the Senate: organizing the dissident Republican members to challenge the power of the party hierarchy.

¹² G. W. Norris, *Fighting Liberal*, New York, 1945, 93-97; Alfred Lief, *Democracy's Norris*, New York, 1939, 68, 71-72; Richard L. Neuberger and Stephen B. Kahn, *Integrity: The Life of George W. Norris*, New York, 1937, 31-33.

¹³ *Collier's Weekly*, June 21, 1924; *Saturday Evening Post*, August 7, 1920.

Norris was present, however, when Congress reconvened after the Christmas recess. His plan to amend the rules was accepted by the group as the best way to make the House truly representative. Most of the insurgents at this time agreed that a change of speakers or a change of parties would not lessen the power of the Speaker, while a change in the rules would remove the source of his power and more nearly solve the problem. Norris explained: "the rule that gives the Speaker power to appoint all the standing committees of the House, which [in turn] practically control all of the legislation of the House," was the rule that was most obnoxious to those who believed that the Speaker had too much authority.¹⁴

Though the insurgents challenged the rules throughout this short session, they realized that any resolution to change them would be referred to the Committee on Rules, of which the Speaker was chairman and dominant member. Once the members at the beginning of a Congress approved the rules, the only way to amend or change them was to obtain the Speaker's consent, which the insurgents knew would not be forthcoming. Congressman Hepburn summed up this dilemma nicely when he said: "Oh, it is easy to get into the Committee on Rules, but by what hoist and by what petard would we get out of the Committee on Rules?"¹⁵ This session also revealed the possibility that the insurgents, by joining with the Democrats, might swing the balance of power away from the Republican party. By threatening the Speaker in this way the insurgents hoped that they might wrest some concessions.

Cannon, aware of this possibility, hoped to split the insurgent ranks by allowing a minor amendment to the rules, which was quickly adopted as the session drew to a close. It created a "calendar Wednesday" where no business but the calling of committees would be in order. Norris denounced this as "a sop" which did not solve the problem of making the House a really "representative body instead of a one-man machine."¹⁶

Thus as the administration of Theodore Roosevelt came to an end, insurgency appeared as an organized movement which was gaining strength and national recognition. Speaker Cannon, colorful and gruff, had become in many newspapers, magazines and in the public mind, the "Iron Duke" who tyrannized the House of Representatives. While most of the insurgents criticized the rules, many

¹⁴ *Congressional Record*: Sixtieth Congress, Second Session, 817.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, 2655.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, 3570.

of the journalists attacked the man. By the end of 1908 they helped to make the Speaker a subject of national attention, and "Cannonism" a system that reformers sought to eradicate.¹⁷ Though Norris continued to respect Cannon, the Speaker, pressed and harassed on all sides, by members of his own party, by the Democratic opposition, by the press and by increasing public clamor, began to utilize fully the tremendous power at his disposal.

When President Taft, as one of his first official acts, called Congress into special session less than two weeks after the previous one had adjourned, the fight to reform the rules promised to become a focus of national attention. Norris was determined to push for reform, though it would probably cost him all the standing his seniority had accumulated. Even before the special session started, parliamentary manoeuvring began over the question of adopting the rules of the previous session. Once these rules were adopted virtually all hope of modifying them during the 61st Congress would be ended. Now that Hepburn had retired to his Clarinda, Iowa, law office, insurgent strategy during this fight was determined by A. P. Gardner of Massachusetts, John M. Nelson of Wisconsin, and E. H. Madison of Kansas. But Norris led the floor fight. He claimed that the real authority in government was being exerted by the "Iron Duke" who, "crowned with the power given him by the rules, reaches out his mighty hand and forces even the Chief Executive to do his bidding." He concluded his attack with the statement, "We insurgents may have the life crushed out of us by the machine, but the cause is right, and in the end it must prevail."¹⁸

Norris was correct in his prediction. Nevertheless the insurgents were responsible for further concessions from Cannon, because they revealed that an effective Insurgent-Democratic alliance could now challenge the Speaker's power. The previous rules were amended to improve the functioning of the House. Hampering neither the Speaker's control of the Committee on rules nor his power to appoint standing committees, the modification came about through an arrangement by Cannon with Representative John J.

¹⁷ Charles R. Atkinson, *The Committee on Rules and the Overthrow of Speaker Cannon*, New York, 1911. Chapter VI entitled "The Development of Public Sentiment Against the Speaker" presents a survey of growing press and periodical hostility. *LaFollette's Magazine* between February and the end of April, 1909, contained six articles attacking the power of the Speaker.

¹⁸ *Congressional Record*: Sixty-First Congress, First Session, 32.

Fitzgerald and Tammany leaders in New York who presumably were representing the Standard Oil Company and other high tariff interests. According to Kenneth Hechler, the only scholar who has seriously tried to explain this incident, the Speaker promised to support a higher duty on petroleum and other items in the pending tariff bill in return for enough Democratic votes to prevent the insurgents in alliance with Champ Clark, the Democratic leader, from further amending the rules.¹⁹

After the rules fight, the House settled down to the urgent business of preparing a new tariff law. In the struggle over the Payne-Aldrich tariff Norris again tangled with Cannon and this time he out-manoeuvred him. He offered an amendment which reduced the duty on petroleum and its products from 25 per cent to a nominal one per cent. The amendment prevailed and then by unanimous consent petroleum and its products were placed on the free list.²⁰ Cannon, in committee as well as on the floor, had insisted on the 25 per cent rate, and if Kenneth Hechler's analysis is correct, Norris was responsible for Cannon's inability to keep his pledge to Fitzgerald and the twenty-two other Democrats whose votes had saved him from defeat at the outset of the Special Session. Though successful on this one point, Norris and the insurgents were able to do little more than complain of Cannon's masterful direction of the controversial tariff bill through the House. And at the end of the special session in August, 1909, the insurgents felt the power and anger of the Speaker when, without exception, they were downgraded to committees which Norris claimed were "dead and committees in name only."²¹

Actually, at this time the position of Norris and his fellow insurgents had not yet been clarified because no one knew whether William Howard Taft intended to continue the Roosevelt policies. Taft's position was clearly revealed to the insurgents when he fired Louis R. Glavis, in September, 1909, and Glifford Pinchot in January, 1910, thereby exonerating his Secretary of the Interior, Richard Ballinger. In the furor that followed Norris again tangled with and bested Cannon in a way that must have grated. In January, 1910, Norris presented an amendment providing that House members of the joint-committee to investigate the Ballinger-Pinchot controversy "ought to be elected by the House of Representatives and

¹⁹ Kenneth W. Hechler, *Insurgency*, New York, 1940, 54-59.

²⁰ Norris, *Fighting Liberal*, 102; Hechler, *Insurgency*, 60-63.

²¹ Norris to Adam Breede, September 4, 1909.

not appointed by the Speaker."²² By combining forces, Democrats and insurgents carried the resolution by three votes, thereby insuring a fuller and fairer hearing than otherwise would have been possible. At the same time Cannon was administered a stinging rebuff, his first clear defeat in the battle against the insurgents. If Cannon had not previously been aware, he now must have recognized George W. Norris as a foe whose understanding of parliamentary procedure and manoeuvring rivaled his own. Since the Insurgent-Democratic coalition could outvote the regular Republican members, Cannon undoubtedly realized from this defeat that eternal vigilance was demanded lest he give the insurgents the opportunity to revise the rules.

In the eyes of the insurgents, President Taft had allied himself with the Speaker against the cause they had been fighting. They felt that Cannon, a long-time and bitter foe of conservation, had won the administration to his point of view. The President, they were convinced, was a traitor to the Roosevelt policies and another bulwark of the system of privilege they were attacking. Indeed, Taft's treatment of them at this time assured Norris that the insurgents were correct in their evaluation.

As the Ballinger-Pinchot controversy swirled about him, the President decided to use the patronage weapon against insurgent Republicans on the ground that they were helping to bring the Democratic party into power.²³ Taft apparently took this position upon the insistence of Cannon and other Republican leaders, and Norris was one of the first victims.

Thus by the end of January, 1910, the stage was set for the dramatic and historic battle that climaxed the insurgency revolt. Norris and his fellow insurgents, deprived of their patronage and committee standing, ignored by many of their colleagues, branded as disloyal Republicans and avowed enemies of the administration, had everything to gain and nothing to lose if only they could find a legislative lever to open a wedge in the House rules. By this time, Norris had emerged as their outstanding leader and most skillful parliamentarian. Though he found his position in Congress and his life in Washington unpleasant, under no circumstances did he intend to deviate from the path he was pursuing. Correspondence approving his actions assured him that popular support at

²² *Congressional Record*: Sixty-First Congress, Second Session, 390.

²³ Norris to William Howard Taft, January 6, 1910; Hechler, *Insurgency*, 216.

the next election would not be withdrawn even if his patronage were.

With patience and fortitude Norris awaited the opportunity to wage war against the powers that Cannon and his chief lieutenants were ruthlessly exercising. He hoped this occasion would come soon. If not, he claimed he would still be satisfied with the knowledge that he had helped to sow the seeds that eventually would allow others to "reap an effective harvest for free and untrammelled representation in the House."²⁴ As it turned out, Norris had but a short time to wait. In March, 1910, Cannon made a parliamentary blunder that gave Norris the opportunity to introduce again his May, 1908, resolution—this time to precipitate the revolution that curtailed the power of the Speaker.

On the eve of the historic rules fight in March, 1910, Cannon and Norris symbolized the past and the future of the Republican party—one group seeking to consolidate its entrenched position and the other vying for control. Born before the Civil War Cannon had grown to maturity in the political environment of Half-Breeds and Stalwarts and had accepted Grantism, while Norris represented an important segment of the oncoming generation of national leaders. Born during or after the Civil War this generation came to political maturity when indignant criticism was being leveled against their party and when ephemeral third parties, and by 1896 even the Democrats, were demanding social change. The older generation which had first helped to preserve the Union, in the post-war period with the aid of the soldier-vote cemented the Republican alliance between business and politics. Their members were largely desirous of continuing in these established grooves, and from their ranks came the stand-patters and many of the opponents of national expansion. On the other hand, the younger generation of Republican leaders, like most of the reformers did not question the accumulation of wealth. They were more concerned with its concentration and inequitable distribution. From their ranks came the insurgents as well as a large majority of the progressives and imperialists, though it does not always follow that an individual stand-patter or progressive was a friend or foe of imperialism.

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²⁴ Norris to C. L. Fahnestock, January 11, 1910.

Roger Barlow: First English Traveler in the Pampas

The first eye-witness account in English of the New World was written around 1540 by an English merchant named Roger Barlow.¹ Ignored for nearly four centuries, Barlow's *A Brief Summe of Geographie*² describes the experiences of perhaps the first Englishman ever to set foot on the vast Pampas of the River Plate regions.

In 1526, Roger Barlow was already a well-established, prosperous merchant in Seville, Spain. Another English merchant in the same city and a good friend of Barlow's was Robert Thorne, of the famous trading family of Bristol. Allured by the possibility of reaching the Spice Islands by a shorter route than Magellan's, a number of Sevillian merchants formed a company for the purpose of making a voyage to those fabulous islands, under the command of Sebastian Cabot. Among the backers of this proposed expedition were Robert Thorne, and Roger Barlow.³ Thorne's interest in this expedition was two-fold: first, he was, of course, interested in compounding his investment, but, second, and more important to him, he wanted certain information regarding a possible passage to the Pacific by way of the polar regions. Since, according to his calculations, that was the shortest distance between western Europe and the Spiceries, it was first necessary to ascertain whether the Pacific Ocean lay continuously open in that direction.

The man chosen by Thorne to carry out his plans of discovery was Roger Barlow. It was arranged that Barlow and another Englishman, Henry Latimer, a competent pilot, should sail with Sebastian Cabot as super-cargoes, for the purpose of learning all that

¹ E. G. R. Taylor, Introduction to Roger Barlow, *A Brief Summe of Geographie*, The Hakluyt Society, 2nd Ser., No. LXIX, London, 1932, xxviii. The date 1540 is confirmed by the watermarks on the manuscript.

² The original manuscript, which has no title, is docketed, *Geographia Barlow* in the Royal Library of the British Museum. The title here indicated was supplied by Taylor from a phrase employed by Barlow. Taylor, *Tudor Geography, 1485-1583* London, 1930, 45.

³ Henry Harrisse, *John Cabot the Discoverer of North America, and Sebastian Cabot his Son. A Chapter of the Maritime History of England under the Tudors, 1496-1557*, London, 1896, 183-184.

the voyage could teach them. Young, serious-minded, well-educated, accustomed to seamen and the sea, and above all, a loyal Englishman, he was just the man to make a suitable leader for an English overseas discovery. On April 3, 1526, a Spanish fleet composed of three caravels and a brigantine left Seville for the Spice Islands. Barlow, himself, sailed on Cabot's flag-ship, and appears to have acted as assistant to Hernando Calderón, treasurer of the undertaking.⁴

The expedition, however, never reached its objective, due to disaster. While rounding Santa Catalina, off the present-day Río de la Plata (then called Río de Solís) the flag-ship was lost. On Santa Catalina Island, Cabot found a survivor of de Solís' expedition, one Henrique Montes, who claimed to have heard from the Indians that gold and silver were to be had by sailing up the Paraná River, for the river allegedly had its source in a sierra rich in precious metals. In February, 1527, leaving the sick and one of the larger ships at the mouth of the Uruguay, Cabot changed his objective, and with the remainder of his party sailed up the Plata and the Paraná in search of treasure.⁵

Barlow's first-hand account of what he saw on the shores of the Plata is the first of its kind in the English language. In his description of the Río de la Plata, this early traveler mentions the multitude of seals and the numerous shoals which made navigation of the estuary both difficult and hazardous. He gives a very full description of the country, its vegetation, its birds and beasts, and its people.

As the expedition progressed up the muddy Paraná, Barlow was impressed by the luxuriant vegetation, and he describes in detail the strange fauna and flora on the river's edge:

This river of parana is a marvelous goodlie rever and a grete, for of iij hundreth leges and above that we went up in it, the narrowest place from one shore to an other was above ij or iij leges brode. This river is full of goodlie ilondes and plesant, for thei be full of trees of divers sortes and the levis of them alwais grene, and the bowis hange downe into the water and many straunge birdes brede in them. In one iland that we came to there were no maner of birdes in it but onlie white hernes, where

⁴ The presence of an Englishman aboard the flagship does not seem to have elicited undue comment among the Spanish crew. According to José Toribio Medina, *El veneciano Sebastián Caboto al servicio de España*, Santiago de Chile, 1908, tomo I, 226: "His companions had Hispanicised his name and they called him Rodrigo del Barco, and more commonly, Roger Carlo or Barlo."

⁵ Taylor, *Tudor Geography*, 56.

we went alande, and in less time than ij houres we killed with staves and bowes above a thousande. . . . And by other ilandes we passed whercin was none other birdes as we coude perceave but popyngayes and turtill doves and an other sort of smal byrdes which be no bigger of bodie then the toppe of mans thombe but they have the goodliest colored fethers that ever man might se, the colours wold chaunge in moving of them as it were chaungeable silke.⁶

At least two voyages were made up the Paraná, and the extreme nothern point reached by the expedition was probably not far from the site of the present-day city of Asunción, on the Paraguay River. Barlow, always a very keen observer, describes, in one instance, the method employed by the Indians to hunt deer:

Along the river of parana is a goodlie plaine contreie, and goodlie wood of divers kynds of trees that be alwais grene wynter and somer. Ther be many wyld beasts and a straunge facion of shepe, oystreges, and red dere, wch the indies do hunte by divers waies, but not with dogges for ther be none in the contreie but certain mastifes that we brought with us out of spayne. One maner of ther huntynge is this. They wil go together iij or iiij hundred indies wheras thei se thes beasts feding in the playn, and wil go between them and the mountaines and compasse them about saving one waie toward the river, and then every man setteth fier in the drie gras and when thes bestes se the fier and smoke behinde them thei leve the covert and renne toward the ryver, and the indies folowe them til thei come almost to the revers side and then thei presse upon them with ther bowes and arowes and force them to take the water, for backe ageyne thei shel have moche adoo to skape, and whem thei be in the water ther be indies redy with ther canoos and so chase them up and downe in the river and kyll them wt ther bowes and arowes.⁷

It is evident from Barlow's account, that the expedition encountered friendly, peaceful Indians, as well as the warlike Guaranis, who, he claims, practiced cannibalism:

Upon the cost of santa marie toward santsalvadore be certyne generations of indies called biguais and charnais which liveth by fyshing and huntynge, and these do not ete one another. But from sent salvador up the river parana be a grete generation of indies called guaranies which be verie yll people and contynuallie make warre upon ther bordres and one ete another, and if they take ther enemye alife thei bryng him home, and if ther prisoner be not fatte he will kepe him till suche tyme as he be in good plight, and in this meane tyme thei wyl cherishe and fede him with the

⁶ Barlow, *Brief Summe*, 160. The original spelling is maintained in the quotations of Barlow. It is interesting to note the inconsistencies in the spelling.

⁷ *Ibid.*

best meates that he can get and one of his wifes shal have keping of him, and at all times that he lysteth he shal take his pleasure of her, but every night he shalbe tyed and watched for steling awaie. And every daie she wil paint him and dresse as though he ware her owne husbond and wil lede him with a corde made of coton tied about his necke from place to place, accompanied with many daunsyng and syngyng, and making as moche pleasure as thei can, and he likewise wt them, till suche tyme that thei do entende to kyll him.⁸

In March, 1528, the expedition encountered Diego García, who had been sent there by the Spanish crown, with the express purpose of exploring the Río de Solís. Thereupon, Cabot determined to establish his own priority by sending back an immediate report to Spain, requesting permission to continue his explorations, and also supplies to make it possible. The Englishman, Roger Barlow, and the treasurer, Hernando Calderón, were dispatched on this important mission to Charles V. Unfortunately, however, just as they were about to conclude the negotiations for supplies, Francisco Pizarro arrived with the news of his Peruvian discoveries, bringing with him many rich specimens of gold and silver to substantiate his claims. In view of this new development, Charles V lost interest in the Río de Solís expedition, and Sebastian Cabot received no supplies.⁹

Barlow spent the next decade in his homeland, engaged in the busy life of a prosperous merchant. The death of his friend and business associate, Robert Thorne, and the preoccupation of King Henry VIII with other matters, compelled Barlow to put aside his dreams of a passage to the Pacific. However, in 1540-1541, Barlow once more took up his project. In order to strengthen his proposal to King Henry VIII for the establishment of an all-English trade route to the Spice Islands, Barlow accompanied his documents with the treatise, *Brief Summe of Geographie*.¹⁰ Actually, his treatise was almost a word for word translation of an earlier Spanish work by Martín Fernández de Enciso, entitled, *Suma de Geographia* (1518). A comparison of Barlow's work with that of Enciso, however, reveals that the Englishman added a lengthy account of what he, personally, had seen in the Plata basin. Since Enciso's knowledge of South America did not extend beyond Cape

⁸ *Ibid.*, 156-157.

⁹ Richard Biddle, *A Memoir of Sebastian Cabot; With a Review of the History of Maritime Discovery*, Philadelphia, 1831, 156.

¹⁰ Royal MSS. 18 B. XXVIII, British Museum.

Santa María, the authenticity of this part of the work is established.¹¹ A further check on the validity of the addition made by Barlow is the extant letter, dated July 10, 1528, and written by one, Luis Ramírez, a crew-member of the same expedition, in which Ramírez describes essentially the same things as does Barlow.¹²

Due to the death of Henry VIII in 1547, plus the change in cosmographical thinking that had evolved during the previous twenty-five years, the plans of Thorne and Barlow were never executed. Barlow died in 1554, a disappointed man, little dreaming that he would still be remembered four hundred years later as the first English travel writer on South America.

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¹¹ Taylor, Introduction, *Brief Summe of Geographie*, xi. Writes Taylor: "It is typical of the lag of English knowledge behind that of the Continent, that Roger Barlow did not feel the necessity of adding a single line to Enciso's description of Central and North America and the West Indies written in 1518." *Ibid.*, 1.

¹² *Ibid.*, xxiv. According to HARRISSE, *John Cabot*, 201, Ramírez's letter has been published in the original Spanish by Adolfo de Varnhagen, in the *Revista de Instituto Histórico e Geográfico do Brazil Trimesal*, Rio de Janeiro, XV (1852), 14-41. In 1843, Ramírez's letter was translated into French, and appeared in Ternaux-Compans, *Nouvelles Annales de Voyage*, III (1843). This French translation, undoubtedly, led Taylor to assume that Ramírez was a Frenchman.

Book Reviews

Emanuel L. Philipp—Wisconsin Stalwart. By Robert S. Maxwell. Madison, Wisconsin, The State Historical Society of Wisconsin. Pp. xvi, 272. \$6.50.

The comment of the *Detroit Free Press* in 1862 regarding the anti-slavery movement—"One millstone will not crush the grain; two are always necessary"—is applicable to the contest between progressives and stalwarts not only in Wisconsin but throughout the nation. The author of this fascinating biography of Governor Philipp has written an account of Wisconsin's most intelligent stalwart as a fitting sequel to his earlier life of LaFollette. Professor Maxwell has had access to a rich store of material dealing with the life of an industrialist-politician who might very well be called the William Howard Taft of Wisconsin. The author has made an excellent use of his materials; his knowledge of the Wisconsin scene is comprehensive; and he relates the story to the trend of national affairs. It is hard to see how he could have packed more information into a relatively small volume. The author's fairness and objectivity is outstanding and in no way influenced by the fact that Cyrus L. Philipp, the son of Governor Philipp cooperated "in all phases of the project."

Emanuel L. Philipp was largely a self-made man in the tradition of Andrew Carnegie. His early life was one of hardship, but left no trace of bitterness. Philipp was quick to recognize and seize a business opportunity; a pioneer in the development of the independent refrigerator car business, he was also associated with the Milwaukee brewery interests.

In 1900, Philipp, and other stalwarts, attempted cooperation with LaFollette; the alliance was short-lived. Philipp came to resent the intemperate charges against business interests generally. He was accused of indulging in the common practice of rebating in violation of the Elkins Act. However, by a personal Appeal to the Attorney General of the United States, William H. Moody, he did obtain a clarification of the rebate provisions of the law.

An especially interesting episode is Philipp's clash with Ray Stannard Baker and S. S. McClure. Philipp resented their accusations and won a verdict in a libel suit in U.S. Circuit Court which cost McClure \$15,000 plus. Whether this verdict was an important factor in the decline of muckraking is a question, as this type of journalism was already on the decline.

Philipp's role in Wisconsin politics is clearly established; he rallied the fragments of stalwart wreckage and gave to those who disliked too much progressive leadership a program which, at least to an extent, resulted in a better balance between contending forces in Wisconsin politics.

Elected governor in 1914, Philipp served (ably) through three 2-year terms. Though originally hostile to the State University and to the Legis-

lative Reference Library (like Governor Heil at a later date), Philipp was flexible and a good listener. From the standpoint of the present, possible Chapter Eleven—"Defender of Civil Rights"—stands out as a reminder that in times of stress excessive zeal can crush civil rights. Philipp was an efficient and courageous war-time governor, a champion of tolerance and civil rights. Any reader with an interest in the history of the progressive movement will certainly need to read this attractive volume.

WILLIAM A. PITKIN

Southern Illinois University

The Civil War, A Narrative. Vol. I, Fort Sumter to Perryville. By Shelby Foote. New York, Random House, 1958. Pp. 840. \$10.

The novelist, Shelby Foote, has fallen in with the parade of writers who are capitalizing on the rising market provided by the approach of the American Civil War centennial. Most of those marching in this parade will remain as faceless as soldiers in any large formation, but not Mr. Foote. This is not just another of many volumes, but a freshly-written, lucid prose synthesis of the works of others before him.

The author is well aware that the novelist in history is always suspect. "In all respects," Mr. Foote explains, "the book is as accurate as care and hard work could make it . . . in writing a history I would no more be false to a fact dug out of a valid document than I would be false to a 'fact' dug out of my head in writing a novel. . . . Wherever the choice lay between soundness and 'color,' soundness had it every time."

The narrative opens with quick, almost hasty sketches of Jefferson Davis and Abraham Lincoln, and leads from there smoothly into the immediate background of the war. From there, Foote dextrously leads the reader from the fighting in the East to the war in the West, and back again, closing with Lincoln's message to Congress in December, 1862. His indebtedness to secondary works is quite apparent at times, and consciously or not, little bits of Bruce Catton, K.P. and T.H. Williams, Freeman, Wiley, Leech and others peer through Mr. Foote's fine prose. But he has not done his fellow authors a disservice, unless by not footnoting them, because the synthesis is a skillful one. Mr. Foote notes that he found the secondary works "invaluable," but the frame of the *Official Records* holds his colorful canvas taut. Even so, I believe still more use might have been made of original sources.

Shelby Foote tells us he accepted "the historian's standards without his paraphernalia," which apparently means the book was written as popular history, not as historian's history. It also means that Mr. Foote does not intend to document the work, and this is the chief lament. Footnotes might seem burdensome for a popular history, but either they or chapter notes should have been used to give credit where credit is due.

A bibliography of two pages is scarcely adequate for an 800 page, fact-filled account, even though there is the promise that the last volume of the projected trilogy will contain "a complete bibliography."

As it progresses, it becomes apparent this is a military history, and a well done one at that. Battle writing is clear and easily understandable, a fact which in itself makes the volume valuable. It is refreshing to find such an artistic blend of description and characterization sifted from the mass of fact. Occasionally an error stands out, such as those jotted down by Professor Frank E. Vandiver in his *New York Times* review. An illustration of this is Foote's statement that General John Pope defeated Little Crow, leader of the Sioux uprising in 1862, when the credit really belongs to Minnesota's Henry H. Sibley. The mistakes are few, however, and in general Mr. Foote lived up to his goal of accuracy. Since this is a military history, it would be unusual to find detailed consideration of other facets of the war, such as politics or finance. It is disappointing to find so little notice taken of logistics, for the best general or the most determined men could not long succeed without attention to that science. Also, Mr. Foote has neglected the war on the water, so far.

Outstanding characteristics of the book are the rhetoric and the attention to the fighting in the West. In spite of the shortcomings, the book will find a prominent place on any shelf of Civil War literature.

ROBERT HUHNS JONES

Kent State University

Crosier on the Frontier, A Life of John Martin Henni, Archbishop of Milwaukee. By Rt. Rev. Msgr. Peter Leo Johnson. The State Historical Society of Wisconsin, Madison, 1959. Pp. XV-240. Illustrated, Paper. \$3.95.

Monsignor Johnson may be said to have commenced preparation for this biography as professor of church history at St. Francis Seminary, Milwaukee, before World War I. That crisis drew him away briefly. During it, he served as chaplain in the armed services, but returned to his professorship shortly after peace was proclaimed. *The Salesianum*, a quarterly made possible by the priest alumni of the Seminary, preserves some record of the author's preparatory work. As editor of this periodical for more than a quarter of a century he has published many documents pertinent to Henni. However, the twenty-seven pages of citations and bibliography on which the text is built are proof that Monsignor Johnson has explored far beyond the manuscript correspondence of his biographee and his friends. Periodical literature of the pioneer era together with primary and secondary works have been drawn upon. The result is, above all, a scholarly work.

The story of Archbishop Henni's life is deeply significant and full of interest. He was a great ecclesiastical figure thrown into the turmoil of

events which boiled on the frontier. The problems of vanishing Indians, of cultural conflicts between immigrants, of nativistic Americans reviling all Europeans, of religious bigots striking blindly at the Church successively came to the surface round about the prelate. Progress and expansion, poverty and riches, venality and heroism were likewise round about him. Monsignor Johnson depicts the man of great sympathy and understanding of people who was able to mold a great Catholic diocese from this amalgam.

It is impossible even to touch upon the chapters which record how Henni accomplished what he did. However, the author's treatment of the Archbishop's influence on the German immigrant question must be singled out for commendation. It is required reading for anyone concerned with this interesting episode of American history.

The State Historical Society of Wisconsin has done a nice job of publishing and is to be commended on keeping the price low. Librarians may grumble over the fact that the paper-back binding will make additional processing necessary before the book may be put on their shelves. Nevertheless, many individuals who will want their private copies will rejoice.

RAPHAEL N. HAMILTON

Marquette University

Embarcadero, Being a Chronicle of True Sea Adventures from the Port of San Francisco. By Richard H. Dillon. Coward-McCann, New York, 1959. Pp. 313. \$4.75.

Denizens of ocean-front cities, youths and elders who cast fond glances out over the seaways that brought their fathers and took away their friends, in short, people for whom the maritime atmosphere means both romance and subsistence, will find this book a delightful companion after sundown obscures the outer world and leaves them to their dreams. It is a string of yarns, unadorned by a genius such as Conrad, lacking even a central theme beyond common acquaintance with San Francisco Bay as starting point for most of the adventures. From a scholarly point of view it arrives without an index, a bibliography, or a single footnote citation. Several times the grammar is quite careless, particularly when that troublesome objective "whom" suddenly becomes the subject of a finite verb. Nevertheless, though they may label *Embarcadero* as "no contribution," few historians will put down the book before reading to the last page.

What it has is integrity. It portrays the man of the sea, especially the pacific sea from Dutch Harbor to Tahiti, though the record runs round the Horn extend the geographic rotundity. There are the bad men and the brave men, predecessors of our beatniks, and the man sailing an 18-footer from Fisherman's Wharf to New Caledonia and Melbourne, the fabulous Bernard Gilboy. Old clippers breeze through the pages like bees.

Mutinies, kidnappings, piracy and barratry recall an earlier "freedom of the seas." Omnipotent captains rule with a marlin spike. Canvas and ropes spell out their authentic functions, and hurricanes tear hulls to skeletons. Mr. Dillon restores the flavor of the old Bay of San Francisco.

W. EUGENE SHIELS

Xavier University, Ohio

Money, Class, and Party: An Economic Study of Civil War and Reconstruction. By Robert P. Sharkey. *The John Hopkins University Studies in Historical and Political Science.* Seventy-seventh Series, Number Two. Baltimore, The Johns Hopkins Press, 1959. Pp. 346. \$5.50.

In this volume, Robert P. Sharkey carries forward the process of re-examining the evidence on which the prevailing interpretation of the Civil War and Reconstruction period is based. Professor Sharkey, like his mentor, C. Vann Woodward, is unimpressed by the historical clichés that bedevil that epoch of our history. He has not been awed by his august predecessors in the field, most of whom disagree with some, or all, of his conclusions.

Professor Sharkey has demolished the impression, fostered by the controversial historiography of Reconstruction, that the Radical Republicans subscribed to a single, consistent, economic program. On the contrary, he has convincingly shown that there were at least three distinct categories of Radical opinion on fiscal questions. In the first class may be found the extreme Radicals of the Thaddeus Stevens, Ben Wade, Ben Butler stripe, who supported the greenback issues, opposed currency contraction, and advocated a high protective tariff. Their adversaries in the financial controversies were more moderate in their attitude toward the South and argued strongly for a hard-money policy of contraction. This group numbered among its leading spokesmen James G. Blaine, William P. Fessenden, Justin S. Morrill, and James A. Garfield. A third faction, which held the balance of power between the contending fiscal extremes, included George W. Julian, John A. Logan, John Sherman, and George S. Boutwell. These men were less concerned with economic principles than with political expediency. During the war and early post-war years, this latter group aided the soft-money element while it was popular to oppose the contraction policy of Johnson's Secretary of the Treasury. The return of prosperity and the election of Grant on a hard-money platform in 1868, swung them into the hard-money camp. Only after that date, Mr. Sharkey contends, could the Republicans accurately be characterized as the sound money party.

Just as his analysis of the principles of the Radicals has destroyed the monolithic conception of that faction, the author's treatment of the capitalists' role in these years reveals gaping discrepancies in a hitherto largely

unchallenged solid front. The variations among the attitudes of the bankers toward Secretary McCulloch's contraction policy are particularly striking. The author identifies and explains the differences among the interests of the metropolitan bankers of the East, the urban bankers of the West, the rural bankers, and the private bankers of the eastern cities.

A major thesis of Mr. Sharkey's book is his contention that the green-back issues of the war period were necessary, as the sponsors of the program contended. This provocative view is most cogently argued. The author holds that neither a heavier tax program nor the sale of government securities for gold at prices substantially below par would have driven or tempted sufficient amounts out of the hoards to supply the currency needs of the government and the economy. Reliance on state bank notes, he reasons, would have been even more inflationary than the "necessary" expedient, issues of fiat money.

Through these and other provocative observations, Robert P. Sharkey's book has made an important contribution, broadening and deepening our understanding of a difficult and significant period in our history.

ROBERT W. MCCLUGGAGE

Loyola University, Chicago

Notes and Comments

The University of Wisconsin Press has done a noteworthy service to historians by reprinting this past March Carl Lotus Becker, *The History of Political Parties in the Province of New York, 1760-1776*, a scholarly gem of the first decade of this century. Moreover, the new book is in two forms, with the paper cover volume listed at one dollar and ninety-five cents, easily available to the short wallets of students, and the cloth cover listed at six dollars and fifty cents. In the Foreword, Arthur M. Schlesinger, points out the place of this earliest of Becker's books in his scholarly growth and the place of Becker in the development of objective historical scholarship. Professor Schlesinger terms the work, first published in 1909, "a minor classic of historical literature," and he considers it fundamental in the historiography of the American Revolution.

Coming from the same Press is a work which all Wisconsin alumni will be pleased to read and which many educators over the country will notice. This is *Some Ferments at Wisconsin, 1901-1947; Memories and Reflections*, by G. C. Sellery, Dean of the College of Letters and Science at the University of Wisconsin, 1919-1942. Canadian-born George Clark Sellery was prominent in the History Department at Madison from 1901, and after World War I gained renown for his administrative abilities as Dean. Now in 1960, looking back over his 87 years, he presents his memories of the important events in which he participated and his reflections upon the many controversies—the Van Hise and Frank philosophies of education, "the Round Robin against La Follette," the Experimental College, academic freedom, and intercollegiate athletics, to mention a few. The book in 124 pages is lithoprinted and is listed at two dollars and fifty cents.

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A warm welcome has been given to *Arizona and the West*, a Quarterly Journal of History, published by the University of Arizona, and edited by John Alexander Carroll. The first number appeared in the Spring of 1959, in excellent format, carrying illustrations and pen sketches. The number elicited numerous comments and suggestions. These are reviewed in scintillating

editorial remarks in the Summer issue under the heading "Orchids, Cacti, and Candor." After these explanations to readers of the Journal's scope and intent, Professor Carroll dedicates the number to the memory of Herbert Eugene Bolton in an essay to which all who knew the "giant among historians" will say "Amen." Since there is some dispute about the territorial boundaries of "the West," Professor Burl Noggle in a long article starts with a definition of the limits of "the Southwest," which, he says, "almost defies definition." The article, "Anglo Observers of the Southwest Borderlands, 1825-1890: The Rise of a Concept," is the vehicle for the comprehensive bibliography on the "Southwest" section of the "West." Four other articles are followed by an all-West book review section in a novel and pleasing typesetting job and by an equally attractive section "A Roundup of Western Reading," by The Old Bookaroos, B. W. Allred, J. C. Dykes, and F. G. Renner. *Arizona and the West* is well-launched on what we hope will be a long and profitable voyage. The annual subscription is five dollars.

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Two books on the history of banking have recently come from Public Affairs Press, Washington, D.C. *The American Bankers Association, Its Past and Present*, by Wilbert M. Schneider, Professor of Economics and Business Administration and currently Academic Dean of Emmanuel Missionary College. Herein is traced a general history of banking in the United States and the prominent part played by the Association from its constitution in 1873. Three periods of growth and development of the Association are particularly marked, each covering twenty-five years: 1875-1900, 1900-1925, 1925-1950. After setting the record forth chronologically, the author gives a comprehensive account of the structure of the ABA, its objectives, its policies with respect to public finance, government in banking, its legal and legislative activities, its war-time and peacetime services. The book will appeal to men of finance and will be useful to historians. It has 275 pages with an index and sells for \$5.00.

The second book, *Women in Banking, a History of the National Association of Bank Women*, by Geniveve N. Gildersleeve, is precisely what the title states. The origin, purpose, development, and achievements of the Association, with sketches of the officers are presented in a factual account based upon the minutes and records of the Association. The book is in 115 pages and is listed at 3.25.